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Abstract 
 
After gaining independence in 1956, Tunisia abolished Shari’a courts, established a 
secular legal system, and implemented extensive reforms to Islamic family law. However, it 
preserved the provision of Islamic inheritance law according to which women inherit half as 
much as men in its new Personal Status Code. This thesis examines why Tunisia preserved 
Islamic inheritance law while reforming almost all other areas of family law after independence. 
Building on existing scholarship, I argue that the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in the 
Personal Status Code reflects concessions made to the religious establishment at independence 
concerning the nature of the code as part of the regime’s strategy for political survival. I 
demonstrate that because the incorporation of religious themes into the legitimating ideology of 
Habib Bourguiba’s regime required the regime to gain rhetorical support for the reforms from 
religious authorities, contestation over the regime’s authority at independence compelled the 
regime to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious establishment, thereby forcing the 
regime to make concessions to the establishment in drafting the new code—including the 
preservation of traditional inheritance law—in order to gain their support. By analyzing how 
state ideology, political environment, and institutional capacity interact to shape state policy on 
family law, the thesis provides insight into the distinctive challenges Middle Eastern states face 
in attempting to reform Islamic law. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 13, 2018, Tunisia’s president Beji Caid Essebsi announced his intention to 
submit a draft law to Parliament instating gender equality in inheritance in Tunisia’s family code, 
a proposal that sparked controversy both within Tunisia and throughout the Arab world. The 
law would make Tunisia the first Arab-Muslim country to overturn the provision in Islamic family 
law according to which women receive half as much inheritance as men and instate gender 
equality in inheritance. Describing inheritance equality as long overdue, Essebsi remarked that 
reform “should have been done in 1956, but the constitution did not provide for it then.”1 While 
women’s and human rights groups have praised the proposal, it has produced significant backlash 
from Islamist, conservative, and even moderate groups and Muslim women who view it as an 
unacceptable departure from Islamic values.2  
Subject and Justification of  the Study  
Tunisia is widely viewed as one of  the most progressive Arab countries. In particular, the 
small North African Muslim state is known for having a distinctive history of  progressiveness with 
regard to women’s rights. After gaining independence in 1956, Tunisia’s government abolished 
Shari’a courts and radically reformed Islamic family law by promulgating a new Personal Status 
Code. The PSC was an innovative and ostensibly secular body of  laws that modified regulations in 
Islamic law on marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, adoption, and to some extent inheritance, 
impacting almost every aspect of family life. Among its reforms, the code outlawed polygamy, 
                                                        
1 Ramy Allahoum, “Tunisia’s President Vows to Give Women Equal Inheritance Rights,” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2018. 
2 Stephen Quillen, “Tunisia’s next Political Battle: Equal Inheritance Rights,” Al Monitor, August 28, 2018. 
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gave women the right to initiate divorce, and abolished the unilateral right of the husband to 
repudiate his wife. The code also instituted a minimum age for marriage, made the registration 
of marriages and divorces mandatory, and required divorce to take place in court. These reforms 
constituted a significant departure from Islamic tradition and were among the first of its kind in 
the region.  
Tunisian women would also become among the first in the Arab world to gain the right 
to work, vote, and open a bank account without spousal consent. The Tunisian state granted 
women the right to have an abortion eight years before women in the United States.3 Today, the 
2014 Constitution of Tunisia enshrines gender equality in the law, declaring the male and female 
citizens are “equal before the law without any discrimination.”4 
Tunisia’s Personal Status Code, however, does not guarantee full equality between 
women and men in the law. Despite its remarkable innovations in other areas of family law, the 
code maintains traditional restrictions on women’s inheritance rights. Based on Islamic 
inheritance law, Section 103 of the code stipulates that “where there are any sons, the male 
inherits twice as much as the female.”5 Tunisia’s inheritance law continues to grant women only 
half the share of inheritance that men receive. Given the code’s innovations in other areas of 
family law, the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in the Personal Status Code is puzzling. 
The modifications to traditional inheritance law in the code are not as striking as in other areas 
of family law and appear incongruent with the character of the reforms as a whole. Given that 
Tunisia secularized its legal system as a whole, it is even more puzzling that Tunisia preserved 
this particular prescription in Islamic law in the new family code. This observation raises the 
                                                        
3 Katrin Bennhold, “Women’s Rights a Strong Point in Tunisia,” The New York Times, February 22, 2011. 
4 Ahmed Nadhif, “Tunisian president calls for gender equality in inheritance law,” Al Monitor, August 21, 2017. 
5 Connor, “Reconciling Religion and the Constitution,” Vardags, August 24, 2018. 
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motivation question of this thesis: why did Tunisia preserve Islamic inheritance law while reforming almost 
all other areas of family law after independence? 
No scholar in the literature on gender and the state in the Middle East and North Africa 
has systematically examined this inconsistency in Tunisia’s family law reforms. Within the 
literature on the Middle East, scholars frequently note that the reforms to inheritance law in the 
PSC were less innovative than in other areas of family law, and some scholars call attention to 
the fact that the stipulation on inheritance inequality seemed incongruent with the character of 
the reforms as a whole, but none have offered an explanation for this inconsistency in the 
reforms. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on state policies on gender in the Middle 
East by developing a more complete picture of the distinctive challenges Middle Eastern states 
face in attempting to reform Islamic law.  
A systematic exploration of  Tunisia’s family law policy has several uses for researchers and 
analysts studying the Middle East in the current moment. Tunisia is regarded as the country at the 
forefront of the Arab world in gender equality today, and the successful reform of  Islamic 
inheritance law in Tunisia could have a ripple effect across the Middle East and North Africa with 
broader implications for family law reform and women’s rights in the region. Understanding why 
inheritance reform was previously unsuccessful is therefore useful to analyzing the potential for 
reform in Tunisia today as well as for gains in women’s rights across the Middle East and North 
Africa. Moreover, an appreciation of  the factors that shaped state policy on family law in Tunisia 
sheds light on the issues at stake in debates surrounding Islamic law and the role that religion 
should play in contemporary Muslim societies more broadly and can inform research in other areas 
of  scholarship on the region.  
The Argument  
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The central argument of this thesis is that the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in 
Tunisia’s Personal Status Code reflects concessions made to the religious establishment’s 
demands concerning the nature of the code as part of the post-independence regime’s strategy 
for political survival. The theoretical framework I adopt to explain this policy outcome 
emphasizes the interaction between three critical factors: (i) state ideology (ii) political 
environment and (iii) institutional capacity. I suggest that the preservation of Islamic inheritance 
law in Tunisia’s family code reflects the interaction of these three factors. Here, I briefly explain 
each factor and how it relates to this policy outcome.   
(i) The first claim of this thesis is that state ideology, or what I also refer to as a regime’s 
“legitimating ideology,” will influence the nature of family law reform. A regime’s “legitimating 
ideology” is a set of overarching rhetorical justifications a regime offers for its political 
authority.6 I suggest that the degree to which a regime relies on religious themes or principles in 
its legitimating ideology will partly determine the nature of family law policy by delineating the 
kinds of policies the regime can adopt with respect to religion. To assess this claim, I examine 
the rhetoric of the post-independence regime in Tunisia in the speeches and statements of the 
state elite as well as foundational state documents such as the Tunisian Constitution.  
(ii) The second claim of this thesis, however, is that ideology alone cannot explain the 
nature of family law policy. While ideology is important to explain policy outcome because it 
frames the policy choices available to a regime, explanations relying on ideology alone cannot 
account for instances in which a regime’s policies contradict one another or the regime’s own 
legitimating ideology. Two other factors are needed to explain the preservation of Islamic 
                                                        
6 Sarah Feuer, “Religious Establishment and Religious Survival” (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2014), 19. 
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inheritance law in Tunisia: the political environment of opponents confronting the regime and 
the regime’s institutional capacity.  
“Political environment” refers to the configuration of the groups a regime perceives to 
be its political opponents and allies.7 I suggest that the degree to which a regime’s political 
opponents frame their demands and base their own claim to legitimacy on religious grounds will 
influence the nature of family law policy. Here, I draw on Sarah Feuer’s theory in emphasizing 
the salience of a regime’s political opponents in determining policy outcomes pertaining to the 
religious establishment. Feuer suggests that what is critical to determining policy outcomes is the 
degree to which opposition forces incorporation religious themes into their demands. Thus, 
confronting these demands, the regime must choose to either coopt the opposition by 
conceding to some of its preferences or to repress it. To assess this claim, I primarily examine 
secondary literature on the politics of the nationalist movement in Tunisia to assess this claim. 
(iii) The third claim of this thesis, moreover, is that like a regime’s legitimating ideology, 
political opposition cannot fully explain the nature of family law policy. This is because in 
advancing its political agenda and determining how to minimize political opposition, regimes 
confront another critical factor: the strength of their institutional capacity. I define “institutional 
capacity” in this thesis as the relative strength or weakness of the political party structure, which 
I measure as ideological consensus among party leaders and members.8 I suggest that extent to 
which a ruling party has the capacity to carry out its political agenda determines whether the 
regime will coopt or suppress opposition forces; institutional capacity, as it interacts with 
                                                        
7 Feuer, “Religious Establishment,” 19. 
8 State capacity often refers to the institutional and administrative features of the state. This thesis examines state 
capacity more narrowly as the ideological cohesion within political party structure  
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political environment, thereby influences the nature of family law policy. To assess this claim, I 
focus on secondary literature on the ruling party in Tunisia at independence.  
 The theory developed in this thesis thus can be summarized as follows: while (i) the 
incorporation of religious themes into a regime’s legitimating ideology will play an important 
role in determining the kinds of polices it can adopt with regard to Islamic family law, policy 
outcomes will be critically shaped by (ii) whether the political opposition confronting the regime 
bases their own claim to legitimacy on religious grounds and (iii) whether the regime has the 
institutional capacity to implement its political agenda without coopting religious opposition 
forces. 
Overall, I demonstrate that because the incorporation of religious themes into the 
legitimating ideology of Habib Bourguiba’s regime required the regime to gain rhetorical support 
for the reforms from religious authorities, contestation over the regime’s authority at 
independence compelled the regime to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious 
establishment, thereby forcing the regime to make concessions to the establishment in drafting 
the new code—including the preservation of traditional inheritance law—in order to gain their 
support.  
Organization of the Study  
The remainder of this thesis proceeds in four parts. Chapter Two provides the 
background information necessary to understand this thesis. The chapter contextualizes 
inheritance law within the family law reforms in Tunisia as a whole as well as the landscape of 
family law throughout the Islamic world. I highlight how both broad historical developments 
and specific state building activities paved the way for family law reform in Tunisia and 
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emphasize how the changes to inheritance law in the 1956 Personal Status Code appeared 
incongruent with the character of the reforms as a whole.  
Chapter Three reviews the literature on gender and the state in the Middle East and 
North Africa to identify existing explanations of state policy on family law as well as highlight 
current gaps in the literature. The first section reviews scholarship on gender and state building 
in the Middle East. I highlight the inability of theoretical frameworks which view family law 
policy as a product of the state building process to explain the variation within Tunisia’s family 
law reform. The second section reviews scholarship on the patriarchal practices of Middle 
Eastern states. I suggest that theoretical frameworks which view family law policy as a reflection 
of the patriarchal interests of the state also cannot fully explain the inconsistencies within 
Tunisia’s reforms. The third section reviews scholarship on the relationship between religion 
and the state in the Middle East. I suggest that theoretical frameworks which view family law 
policy as motivated by state ideology provide a key perspective on this research question. The 
chapter concludes with an explanation of the argument proposed in this thesis.  
The following two chapters assess the explanatory power of this argument. Chapter Four 
begins by examining Bourguiba’s views on Islam and modernization and his strategic approach 
to achieving political goals to understand the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime. I 
establish how the incorporation of religious themes into the regime’s discursive justifications for 
its political authority created a framework within which the regime could maneuver and 
delineated the range of policy options it could adopt without opposing its own stated ideological 
commitments to religion. 
Developing the argument laid out in Chapter Four, Chapter Five examines the political 
environment Bourguiba confronted at independence and the institutional capacity of 
 8 
 
Bourguiba’s regime to understand how the interaction of the regime’s legitimating ideology with 
these factors influenced the nature of the Personal Status Code and thereby the outcome of 
inheritance reform. I highlight the support of religious forces for Salah Ben Youssef, 
Bourguiba’s main political opponent, and emphasize the extent of Ben Youssef’s popular 
support and the threat of internal dissent among Youssefist sympathizers within the Neo-
Destour. My analysis demonstrates that because the incorporation of religious themes into the 
legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime required the regime to gain rhetorical support for 
the reforms from religious authorities, contestation over the regime’s authority at independence 
compelled the regime to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious establishment, thereby 
forcing the regime to make concessions to the establishment in drafting the new code in order 
to gain their support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
2 
 
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW REFORM 
 
Table 1: Landmark Dates 
 
 
1881    Beginning of French colonization 
 
Mid-1950s   Height of nationalist struggle  
 
November 15, 1955  Neo-Destour Congress in Sfax 
 
March 20, 1956  Tunisia proclaims independence  
 
June 1, 1956   Abolition of Shari’a courts  
 
August 13, 1956  Promulgation of the PSC  
 
January 1, 1957   PSC goes into effect 
 
July 25, 1957   Abolition of the monarchy 
Habib Bourguiba appointed interim president by Parliament 
 
June 1, 1959   Constitution officially adopted 
Bourguiba elected first president of Tunisia 
 
1980s-90s    Emergence of Tunisian women’s associations  
 
November 7, 1987   Bourguiba ousted by Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali  
 
1993    PSC revised to allow women to transmit nationality to children   
 
December 18, 2010  Arab Spring begins in Tunisia   
 
January 14, 2011  Ben Ali resigns and flees   
 
December 21, 2014   Beji Caid Essebsi becomes first democratically elected president 
 
August 13, 2017  Essebsi launches COLIBE  
 
August 13, 2018   Essebsi pledges to submit inheritance equality draft law 
 
November 23, 2018   Cabinet approves law and sends to Parliament for ratification   
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To appreciate what is puzzling about the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in 
Tunisia, it is necessary to contextualize inheritance law within the family law reforms in Tunisia 
as a whole as well as the landscape of family law throughout the Islamic world. This chapter 
provides the background information necessary to understand this thesis on family law reform 
in Tunisia, the status of family law in Islam, and the global landscape of Islamic law. The chapter 
begins by overviewing the history of modern Tunisia and Tunisia’s distinctive path to family law 
reform. I highlight how both broad historical developments and specific state building activities 
paved the way for family law reform. The second section contextualizes family law in Islam and 
discusses the role of family law in defining the organization of power in society. I focus on the 
status of inheritance law in Islam specifically and how Islamic inheritance law privileges the 
cohesion of the patrilineal kin group. The third section overviews family law reform in Tunisia 
from independence to the present. I emphasize how the changes to inheritance law in the 1956 
Personal Status Code were not as striking as in other areas of family law and appeared 
incongruent with the character of the reforms as a whole. The chapter concludes by briefly 
contextualizing Tunisia in the global landscape of Islamic law and inheritance reform. 
 
The History of Modern Tunisia: An Overview 
Several recurrent themes have shaped the trajectory of modern Tunisian history that are 
key to understanding Tunisia’s distinctive path of family law reform. Overall, modern Tunisia 
has been defined by the effort to create a political environment acceptable to both government 
and citizens, the attempt to modify or eradicate traditional beliefs and practices viewed as 
impediments to modernization while simultaneously preserving a national identity rooted in the 
precolonial past, and the effort to foster economic growth to provide a stable foundation for 
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political and social development.9 As Kenneth Perkins suggests, the most consequential among 
these debates has centered on the value and role of Islamic tradition in Tunisian society.  
Modern Tunisia has experienced rule by an indigenous monarchy, a colonial 
protectorate, and an independent republican government. From the precolonial to the 
independence period, much of what successive governments have viewed as obsolete in the 
modern world and sought to reform, including family law, has been associated with Islam. An 
appreciation of the development of both Western and Islamic forces throughout Tunisia’s 
modern history is necessary to understand Tunisia’s distinctive path to family law reform. 
French Colonial Rule  
The point at which Tunisia’s modern history begins is open to debate. The imposition of 
French colonial rule, however, is a turning point of unquestioned importance. The French 
Protectorate was established in Tunisia in 1881 and endured until Tunisia’s independence in 
1956. Unlike French rule in Morocco and Algeria, in ruling over Tunisia, the French essentially 
maintained the administrative structure they found in place upon occupying the country. French 
colonial officials preserved the framework of the indigenous government while establishing a 
French-supervised central administration that effectively controlled provincial governments.10 
This restructuring of the central and regional governments progressively consolidated French 
control over Tunisian society.  
French colonial officials introduced changes to the existing government in order to 
centralize local and regional administration and consolidate administrative authority. They 
effectively superimposed features of the French bureaucracy onto the existing indigenous 
                                                        
9 Kenneth Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. 
10 Charrad, State’s and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (London: University of  
California Press, 2001), 40. 
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administration to strengthen their control over the population. The French reduced the number 
of regional administrators (qaids), for example, as a measure towards bureaucratic 
centralization.11 They kept in place the bey of Tunis, who had been ruling as a member of an 
independent dynasty under a distant Turkish suzerainty, but stripped the monarch of effective 
power and endowed it instead in the résident général, the Supreme Representative of France in 
Tunisia.12 While existing regional and local administrations were largely preserved, they were 
placed under French supervision. In many cases, Tunisian qaids became no more than nominal 
leaders.13 
An important feature of French bureaucratic expansion was the introduction of Western 
courts. The introduction of French courts endowed the state with two distinct judicial 
administrations: the religious courts, which adjudicated personal status cases and property 
disputes, and the wizara or secular state court, which was based on the French legal system and 
was granted authority over civil and criminal matters.14 Preserving the religious courts was 
essential to virtually all Muslims.15  
Although French officials refrained from infringing on the operation of the religious 
courts, they progressively introduced changes to the state court that established a network of 
French supervision over local Tunisian officials.16 In 1896, the French placed the wizara under 
the control of the newly created directorate of judicial services, which was headed by a French 
judge. A decade later, the directorate attached French representatives to all Tunisian secular 
                                                        
11 Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 117.  
12 The bey of Tunis is the Tunisian monarch. A suzerainty refers to a sovereign or state that exercise some control over a 
state that is internally autonomous.  
13 Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 116-117. 
14 Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, 47.  
15 Ibid., 45-47. 
16 Ibid., 45. 
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courts, expanding a network of French supervision ostensibly parallel to but effectively in 
control of local government officials. Thus, while Islamic legal institutions remained intact 
during the colonial period, they lost much of their prestige and relevance in the public sphere 
over time.17  
A second important feature of French bureaucratic expansion was the weakening of 
tribal organizations. In terms of social organization, the tribe or kin group is critical in the 
Maghreb because it has historically constituted the basic social unit of society.18 Until the 
nineteenth century in most of the Maghreb, power was the basis of wealth, which was under 
constant threat if it was not linked to control over tribal groups. Ruling elites typically had little 
or no stable property; wealth in the form of land for settled populations and cattle for nomadic 
populations could quickly disappear in the case of war among tribes or displacement by another 
group, which frequently occurred.19 The best way to retain wealth was thus to hold political 
power, or to be in control of other tribal groups.  
While French occupation provoked fewer and smaller tribal rebellions in Tunisia than in 
Algeria or Morocco, tribal uprisings nevertheless occurred.20 The French military suppressed a 
number of violent uprisings throughout its rule. Colonial rule thus had the effect of weakening 
tribal organization in Tunisia, maintaining a trend already present in the precolonial period.21 
Bureaucratic expansion and the development of a market economy further undermined the core 
political function of tribes. As it became increasingly costly to attempt to defend a territory from 
                                                        
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 21. 
19 Ibid., 21. 
20 Ibid., 117. 
21 Ibid., 117. 
 14 
 
interference by a central state, tribes gradually lost their political authority under the colonial 
period. 
Finally, a third important feature of French bureaucratic expansion was the influence of 
the economic interests of the French on the form of colonial rule and on the development of 
social alliances within Tunisian society. Particularly in the early phase of colonization, powerful 
landowners and large companies dominated colonial agriculture. This pattern of land settlement 
differed markedly from that in Algeria, where the French military acquired land through 
physically displacing tribal groups. Seeking to avoid the costs of acquiring land through violent 
means, the French adopted an alternative land policy in Tunisia through which French settlers 
had to purchase land from Tunisian owners, albeit at an unfair price, instead of receiving it for 
free. As a result, capitalistic enterprise and the concentration of private property came to 
characterize colonial economic domination.22  
Importantly, the pattern of economic exploitation in Tunisia resulted in the formation of 
an agricultural and industrial proletariat, composed mostly of agricultural laborers and industrial 
workers employed by the French.23 French settlement created significant socioeconomic 
disruption in rural areas. As French settlers acquired property from what had previously been 
state, tribal, or habus lands, many rural Tunisians were displaced.24 The displacement of the rural 
population created adverse effects on agricultural and craft production and in turn generated 
economic disruption in urban centers. When a labor movement emerged in the 1940s, labor 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 118-119. 
23 Ibid., 119. 
24 Habus land refers to land donated by individuals or families to endow religious institutions.  
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grievances aligned closely with the priorities of the nationalist movement so that the Tunisian 
proletariat became an important political force in the struggle for national independence.25  
In sum, French colonial rule had significant implications for the Tunisian polity. In a 
shift of political power towards the center, the majority of Tunisian tribes lost their autonomy 
from central political authority. The beylical ruler and Tunisian officials who were in power 
during the colonial period also lost credibility in the eyes of the public. The beylical 
administration as a whole came to be perceived as an instrument of colonial rule and would later 
be delegitimized by the nationalist movement. Finally, the development of capitalistic enterprise 
helped generate a labor movement whose interests would converge with those of the nationalist 
movement. 
The Nationalist Movement 
 The Tunisian nationalist movement conducted an anti-colonial struggle through a tightly 
coordinated party that had branches throughout rural and urban areas of the country. The 
nationalist party served as the principle organizational and ideational instrument for national 
liberation from the 1930s to the 1950s. Known as the Neo-Destour, the party was founded in 
1934 during a wave of nationalist sentiment through the amalgamation of several nationalist 
associations. Specifically, the party emerged from the radical wing formed after the split in the 
Old Destour party between traditionalist and secularist factions. Among the leaders of the 
Destourian radicals was Habib Bourguiba, the young lawyer who would ultimately negotiate 
Tunisian independence from France and serve as the first President of the Republic of Tunisia.26  
                                                        
25 Ibid., 119. 
26 Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, 95.  
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A broad-based party, Neo-Destour membership cut across social classes and regional 
affiliations and included both intellectuals, urban workers, and rural tribesmen.27 The strength of 
the nationalist movement was largely due to the alliance between the Neo-Destour party and the 
dominant labor union, l’Union générale tunisienne de travail (UGTT), which collaborated to pursue 
nationalist goals. The collaboration between the two organizations allowed the movement to 
increase pressure against the colonial regime as French industrial owners and landholders 
became the target of both labor and nationalist resistance. 
 Nationalist movements must typically underplay their ideological differences to present a 
unified opposition to the colonizer. Ideological inclusion is thus often imperative to anticolonial 
struggles. The Neo-Destour party reflected this principle in both its ideology and strategy. 
Presenting national sovereignty as the explicit objective of the party and underplaying ideologies 
other than nationalism, party leadership included both liberal professionals and religious figures 
and scholars. The liberal orientation of the Neo-Destour stemmed from the legacy of the Young 
Tunisian party, a small group of young liberal intellectuals active in Tunis in the early twentieth 
century. Influenced by European culture and the reformist movement of the Young Turks in 
Turkey, the Young Tunisians aimed to bring modern education and culture to Tunisia to amend 
what they viewed as backwardness in Tunisian society. The Neo-Destour’s conservative trend, 
on the other hand, stemmed primarily from the legacy of the Old Destour party, which 
promoted an ideology of traditional anticolonialism. Founded in 1920 by a small propertied class 
of urban Tunisians, the Old Destour advocated for the respect and preservation of Arab and 
Islamic culture while fighting for political rights.28 The strength of the Neo-Destour lay in its 
                                                        
27 Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 203. 
28 Ibid., 205. 
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incorporation of both the reformist legacy of the Young Tunisians and the commitment to 
Islam of the Old Destour. Importantly, however, these ideological orientations clashed sharply 
with each other as the nationalist struggle began to conclude. 
Internal party conflicts arose as independence from France and the opportunity to gain 
political power in a new independent state became an increasing possibility. Two nationalist 
leaders representing competing radical and conservative orientations emerged at the forefront of 
the party: the reformist Habib Bourguiba and the pan-Islamist Salah Ben Youssef.29 Bourguiba 
and Ben Youssef disagreed on the strategy to gain independence, appealed to different 
constituencies, promoted different visions for the independent state, and received different 
international support. Bourguiba and Ben Youssef came to represent the interests of different 
sectors of Tunisian society.  
Generally, Ben Youssef appealed to nationalist forces, including tribes, rural migrants, 
and the religious establishment, that viewed national sovereignty as an opportunity to restore 
Tunisia to its precolonial past.30 Ben Youssef was a strong proponent of pan-Arabism and pan-
Islamism. Advocating solidarity with other Arab and Islamic nations, he promoted pan-Arabism 
and pan-Islam as the ideological foundation for the nationalist struggle and for the future 
Tunisian nation.  
Bourguiba, in contrast, received support from the urban labor union, professional elites, 
and the populations of most coastal towns. In terms of the strategy to gain independence, 
Bourguiba advocated a gradual approach that utilized negotiation instead of the sustained armed 
violence advocated by Ben Youssef. While he publicly asserted his loyalty to Islam, Bourguiba 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 205. 
30 Ibid., 206. 
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sought to develop a distinctive Tunisian nation and an internationally connected modern state 
independent of the pan-Arab movement.31 
Conflict between the two factions of the Neo-Destour reached a crisis in 1955. While 
Ben Youssef advocated armed violence against colonial forces, Bourguiba sought to enter 
negotiations with the French. Tunisian society became profoundly divided between the two 
nationalist factions to the point that Tunisia verged on civil war. In response to the crisis, 
Bourguiba called for a Neo-Destour Congress in November 1955 in a coastal city where Ben 
Youssef enjoyed little support. The presence of the labor union tilted the balance in favor of 
Bourguiba. While Ben Youssef was critically underrepresented at the congress, the labor union 
supported Bourguiba’s instatement as the leader of the party.32 
Tunisian independence was proclaimed on March 20, 1956. Bourguiba, as the leader of 
the winning faction of the nationalist movement, was appointed prime minister in 1956 and later 
elected president in 1957. The Tunisian monarchy, discredited among the public as an 
instrument of colonial rule, was abolished without conflict. Bourguiba would be elected 
president for life in 1975 and remain in power until his ouster in 1987.  
In the wake of independence, Youssefist sympathizers were by and large purged from 
the political sphere. Bourguiba’s regime sought to silence party members and coalitions that had 
supported Ben Youssef’s faction. The purge of the Youssefist faction from the political sphere 
had several important consequences for the formation of the independent state. First, 
Bourguiba’s faction remained largely unchallenged in the government for several years. The 
political authority of Bourguiba’s faction would allow Bourguiba to shape Tunisia’s political 
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institutions in accordance with his vision for the modern state, which he viewed as the primary 
mechanism for modernizing Tunisian society. Second, both remaining tribes and the religious 
establishment lost their influence in the political sphere after independence. Expropriation of 
political power was the consequence for groups that had supported Ben Youssef during the 
nationalist struggle. Third, party division during the nationalist struggle generated a fear of 
political chaos and an obsession with national unity among the new leadership. Bourguiba’s 
regime would continually emphasize the need for national unity in political speeches and mass 
media. Given the atmosphere of national enthusiasm at independence, most Tunisians were 
willing to give Bourguiba’s nascent government a chance to build a new nation-state.33 
Post-Independence State Formation  
Following independence, Bourguiba’s regime also attempted to consolidate state 
institutions. The political leadership—virtually all of whom were products of French 
education—established sweeping social reforms ostensibly to liberate Tunisians from beliefs and 
practices considered obsolete in the modern world and impediments to Tunisia’s development. 
Targets of the reforms included the collective tribal ownership of land, local political autonomy, 
religious property rights, the power of Shari’a courts, and the legal privileges of extended kin. In 
terms of scale and impact, only Kemal Atatürk’s reforms in Turkey in the 1920s are comparable 
example of sweeping modernization efforts in the Islamic world.34  
In one of the most extensive reforms, the political leadership unified local administration 
throughout Tunisia’s national territory. The new government created state and party institutions 
throughout Tunisia to challenge and ultimately replace local tribal solidarities. The expansion of the 
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administrative network following independence was especially remarkable. The number of government 
officials nearly tripled in five years, growing from thirty thousand to eighty-six thousand between 1955 
and 1960.35 
Importantly, the government attempted to impose state control over certain aspects of 
religion. In an extensive reform of collective tribal land ownership and religious property rights, 
the government dismantled the institution of habus, or land donated by individuals or families to 
endow religious institutions.36 Through confiscating the property of the Habus Council, which 
managed land reserved to support mosques, Qur’anic schools, and other Islamic institutions, the 
government brought religious, educational, and charitable institutions that were the beneficiaries 
of the Council’s funds under state control.  
In another significant measure, the government unified Tunisia’s justice system by 
integrating all courts into a single national system. The state abolished religious courts and 
absorbed the two existing Shari’a courts into the new judicial system, creating a unified system 
of secular courts. The abolition of religious courts effectively redefined justice in Tunisian 
society, as citizenship now superseded religion as the foundational principle of the judicial 
system.37 As a whole, the government’s legal reforms have been interpreted as paving the way 
for the promulgation of the Personal Status Code in August 1956.  
In sum, the state building strategy of the post-independence leadership was to 
consolidate the authority of the national state by creating nationwide institutions. The political 
leadership sought to alter existing institutions to redefine social and power relations in Tunisian 
society. By expanding the administrative structure, limiting the independence of religious 
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institutions, and abolishing the collective ownership of tribal land, the political leadership 
launched a radical state building program that promoted a new form of social organization in 
which the political authority of the state superseded the authority of the religious establishment 
and tribal groups. The state building activities pursued after independence ultimately paved the 
way for family law reform.  
 
Islam and Family Law  
Islam constitutes the “idiom of unity”38 throughout the Maghreb. It has historically 
linked otherwise disparate populations into a global Islamic community. Within the Islamic 
community, family law occupies a unique status at the core of the Islamic tradition.39 Multiple 
legal principles that apply to family law are specifically articulated in the text of the Qur’an and 
as such must be respected by all Muslims. 
Any family law promotes normative conceptions of gender. Indeed, the most explicit 
aspect of Islamic family law concerns gender relations. Structurally, Islamic law places women in 
a subordinate status to men by giving power over women to men as husbands and male kin.40 
Islamic law effectively permits the control of women by their kin group.  
Any family law also offers a particular vision of kin relations. Family law promotes 
certain conceptions of solidarity between kin by privileging certain relations in the kinship unit 
over others, whether explicitly or implicitly. Western family law, for example, has typically 
privileged parent-child and spousal relations since the emergence of the modern nuclear family. 
Islamic law, in contrast, treats the marital unit as easily breakable and privileges the cohesiveness 
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of the extended patrilineal kin group. Islamic law presents a vision of the family as an extended 
kin group united by strong ties between agnates, or male relatives in the paternal line.41  
Taken together, the conceptions of gender and kinship embedded in family law promote 
a particular vision of society. As Mounira Charrad suggests, the way in which family law defines 
power relations and bonds of solidarity in the kin group, and the way in which these dimensions 
interact with gender, is key to understanding the distinctive role of Islamic family law in 
structuring Maghrebi societies. 
Family Law in Islam 
Islam does not differentiate between theological principles and the principles that guide 
civic life. Laws regulating social life in Islamic societies are deeply rooted in religion. As such, 
Islamic law plays a central role in defining the social and moral structure of Muslim populations 
and the “Islamic way of life.”42 
Islamic law is referred to as the Shari’a. While the Shari’a stipulates many aspects of 
private and social life, it contains the most explicit prescriptions in the areas of kinship and the 
family.43 Specifically, it elaborates principles to be followed in matters of personal status, kin 
relations, family life, and property rights.  
There is no single religious text that constitutes the Shari’a. Rather, the law is derived 
from four sources in decreasing order of authority. The two most authoritative sources are the 
word of God as represented in the Qur’an and the Sunna, or the behavior of the Prophet 
Muhammad as recorded in the Hadith. The third and fourth sources involve qiyas and ijma, or 
reasoning by analogy and community consensus. If a new issue arises which the two primary 
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sources do not address, jurists and scholars turn to consensus and analogy with principles 
contained in the primary sources. These multiple processes have produced a number of religious 
schools. 
Importantly, the two most authoritative sources of Islamic law—the Quran and the 
Hadith—the texts that pertain to women and the family contain room for multiple 
interpretations. The ambiguity of the texts has caused disagreement among Islamic scholars over 
the exact meaning of statements pertaining to women and the family and has resulted in a 
number of major accepted interpretations. The adaptability of Islamic texts is due in in part to 
the absence of a centralized clergy in the dominant Islamic tradition, or Sunni tradition. Islam 
has adopted a different character in the variety of settings in which it has taken root.  
Four major legal schools have developed within the Sunni tradition which contain small 
but important variations in legal regulations concerning women and the family. The school 
known as Maliki has historically predominated in the Maghreb. Of the four legal schools, the 
Maliki school has been most suited to the social structure of the Maghreb insofar as it allowed 
Maghrebi societies to adopt Islam with minimal changes to structures of extended patrilineage.44 
Islamic Inheritance Law  
Islamic family law is designed to sanction the control of women by male relatives and 
maintain the cohesion of the patrilineage. The subordinate status of women is one of the most 
consistent themes in the legal texts and exemplifies the vision of society embedded in Islamic 
law in which women are placed in an inferior position to men. Equally important aspects of the 
law are its toleration of a fragile marital bond and its identification of relations among agnates 
over marital relations as the critical bonds for an individual in society. This appears, for example, 
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in laws on divorce and polygamy as well as inheritance which favor agnatic relatives over the 
spouse. As a whole, Islamic family law embodies a concept of kinship that privileges male kin in 
the paternal line.45 
 No other area of Islamic law privileges the rights of agnates as much as inheritance law. 
Specific regulations notwithstanding, Islamic inheritance law contains two consistent themes. 
First, inheritance law favors men over women. A woman always receives half as much 
inheritance as a man would in a comparable position. Second, inheritance law privileges agnatic 
relatives. It is not just men who are privileged over women, but specifically male relatives on the 
paternal line.  
The prescriptions on inheritance lie at the core of Islamic family law. Many Muslims 
consider them “the most sacred and untouchable part of the Shari’a.”46 Strict and precise, 
inheritance laws allow little personal choice in matters of succession.47 Rather, the inheritance 
rights of an individual are largely dependent on kinship relations.  
Under Islamic inheritance law, an individual can transfer only one-third of their property 
through their will. The other two-thirds are distributed by the law to specific relatives on the 
basis of kinship relation. The Qur’an identifies in meticulous detail the recipients of the 
remaining two-thirds as well as the hierarchy for the order of heirs and what share of property 
each heir is to receive. An individual cannot deprive an heir of their inheritance right, change the 
amount of an heir’s share, or alter the order in which heirs inherit. The textual prescriptions are 
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imperative insofar as they constitute a divine commandment.48 For example, the Qur’an 
stipulates inheritance rules with the following degree detail:  
If there be more than two girls, they shall have two-thirds of the inheritance; but 
if there be one only, she shall inherit half. Parents shall inherit a sixth each, if the 
deceased have a child; but if he leave no child and his parents be his heirs, his 
mother shall have a third. If he have brothers, his mother shall have a sixth after 
payment of any legacy he may have bequeathed or any debt he may have 
owed…You shall inherit the half of your wives’ estate if they die childless. If they 
leave children, a quarter of their estate shall be yours after payment of any legacy 
they may have bequeathed or any debt they may have owed. Your wives shall 
inherit one quarter of our estate if you die childless. If you leave children, they 
shall inherit one-eight…This is a commandment from God. God is all knowing 
and gracious.49 
 
 It is noteworthy that while agnatism pervades Islamic family law, inheritance law diverges 
from pure agnatism in that it grants a share of property to relatives whom a standard of pure 
agnatism would exclude from inheritance, including fathers, mothers, daughters, son’s 
daughters, sisters, uterine brothers, grandfathers, and grandmothers.50 A rule of pure agnatism 
would exclude most of these recipients from succession, whereas Islam identifies them as heirs. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that agnates had even greater inheritance privileges before the 
advent of Islam, and that Islamic law in fact significantly reduced the agnatism that pervaded 
customary law.51 Nonetheless, although Islamic law qualified agnatism, it did not eradicate it. 
Islam retained explicit forms of agnatism in family law and continued to privilege paternal male 
relatives in inheritance.  
The rule according to which a woman inherits half as much as a man applies to all 
cases.52 Regardless of her position in the order of heirs or her familial relation to the individual 
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whose property is being inherited, a woman receives only half of what a man in the same 
position would receive.53 For example, if a brother of the deceased individual receives the 
equivalent of ten thousand dollars, a sister would receive only five thousand. More dramatically, 
if a man leaves an estate and his only relatives are a son and a distant paternal male cousin, the 
entire estate would go to the son. However, if his only relatives are a daughter and a distant 
paternal male cousin, the daughter would receive only half of the estate, while the remainder 
goes to the distant cousin who would inherit as the nearest agnate. In each of these cases, the 
familial relation of the inheriting relatives to the deceased is identical; gender alone makes the 
difference in the distribution of property.  
With gender inequality and agnatic privilege as two of its main features, Islamic 
inheritance law is suited to a society in which extended kin groups predominate as the form of 
social organization. In favoring distant male relatives over immediate female kin, Islamic 
inheritance law promotes the solidarity of the extended family. Inheritance by agnatic relatives 
supports a social structure in which individuals rely on agnates for resources and where the main 
source of solidarity lies with the tribal group.54  
In sum, Islamic family law both regulates gender relations within the family and defines 
the organization of power in society more broadly. Inheritance law is central to understanding 
the organizing principles of a society, especially a society in which the economy is not dominated 
by market relations, because it reveals the desired patterns of the distribution of resources in that 
society. Islamic inheritance law can therefore be viewed as an instrument to maintain relations 
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within the patrilineage insofar as it privileges agnates in the distribution of the resources in 
society.  
 
Family Law Reform  
 On August 13, 1956—less than five months after it proclaimed independence—Tunisia 
promulgated a new Personal Status Code (PSC). The PSC altered Islamic family law and 
transformed women’s legal status in Tunisia in significant and unprecedented ways. The laws 
modified regulations in Islamic law on marriage, divorce, alimony, custody, adoption, and to 
some extent inheritance, impacting almost every aspect of family life. An appreciation of the 
character of the reforms as a whole is necessary to understand what is puzzling about the 
preservation of Islamic inheritance law in the new code.  
The 1956 Personal Status Code 
 The PSC discarded the vision of the family as an extended kin group and replaced it with 
the vision of a conjugal family. Moreover, while it decreased the responsibilities of extended kin 
in family matters, it also increased women’s autonomy in their private lives.55 The code 
abolished polygamy and the unilateral right of the husband to repudiate his wife, gave women 
the right to initiate divorce, and increased women’s custody rights. It made instituted a minimum 
age for marriage, made the registration of marriages and divorces mandatory, required divorce to 
take place in court, and identified the wife as responsible for contributing financially to the 
household. In addition, the code made adoption legally valid and required all citizens to have a 
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patronymic name for. Finally, it abolished the institution of habus and modified certain rules on 
inheritance.56 
 It should be emphasized that the PSC was a top-down reform implemented by the 
leaders of the ruling party at independence; it was not a response to pressures from a grassroots 
feminist movement. Although women had participated in the nationalist struggle, no women’s 
movement had developed in Tunisia before the promulgation of the code. Rather, the 
lawmakers behind the reform primarily viewed the PSC as an instrument of social change. They 
viewed code as a means of transforming kinship, which they viewed as necessary to encourage 
broader social change. The Minister of Justice who played a central role in drafting the code, for 
example, stated that he and his collaborators sought to eradicate practices they considered as 
“feudal,” such as child marriages, polygamy, and divorce by repudiation, and orient Tunisia 
towards the “modern world.”57 Close collaborators of Bourguiba have also noted that they do 
not recall Bourguiba speaking specifically about the status of women at the time of the reform. 
Rather, they recalled his treating women’s rights as part of the general emancipation of Tunisian 
society from the legacy of colonialism and outdated forms of social organization.58  
 Importantly, when the PSC was promulgated in 1956, the Ministry of Justice also 
published an official statement declaring the Islamic character of the new laws. The 
communiqué stated that “religious judges and scholars had participated in [its] preparation,” that 
the code had been granted their approval, and that the code was based on Islamic sources.59 
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Lawmakers presented the code as a new phase of Islamic interpretation, similar to earlier phases 
of interpretation that have marked the evolution of Islamic legal thought throughout its 
history.60 They distinguished it from Kemal Atatürk’s reforms in Turkey, which abandoned 
Islamic law altogether in 1926 and replaced it with a civil code based on that of Switzerland.  
 In contrast, lawmakers emphasized the continuing faithfulness of the PSC to Islamic 
heritage. While it does not mention Islam explicitly, the PSC was framed as a necessary step to 
rejuvenate the Islamic tradition. To what extent the code is effectively Islamic or secular has 
been contested since its promulgation. The code radically reformed certain interpretations of 
Islamic law while at the same time retaining other elements of the Shari’a, including the articles 
concerning inheritance, dowry, and descent. In Charrad words, the PSC can thus be interpreted 
either “as an Islamic body of legislation inspired by secular norms, or a secular body of 
legislation inspired by Islam.”61  
 The PSC was promulgated by a decree of the Tunisian bey before the abolition of the 
monarchy and without being debated in national assembly. The code met with only minor 
opposition due to the political environment in which it was implemented. The main opposition 
to the code came from the conservative factions of the religious establishment, but the 
establishment did not have sufficient political influence to successfully oppose government 
decisions.62 
Modifications to Inheritance Law  
 One of the most puzzling aspects of the PSC is that the laws of inheritance remained by 
and large faithful to Islamic law. The Code maintained the two basic categories of heirs 
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identified in the Shari’a: those who inherit based on their kinship relation to the deceased and 
those who inherit on the basis of agnatism. Moreover, the rule according to which a woman 
inherits half as much as a man was preserved. As Charrad notes, compared to the other 
developments of the code which expanded women’s rights and privileged the conjugal family 
over the extended patrilineage, “the stipulations on inheritance were surprising.”63 The changes 
to inheritance law were not as striking as in other areas of family law; the stipulations on 
inheritance equality appeared incongruent with the character the reforms as a whole. Charrad, 
however, does not offer an explanation for this inconsistency in the reforms. 
 What is also puzzling, moreover, is that while the PSC preserved the stipulation on 
inheritance inequality, the code implemented reforms that expanded women’s inheritance rights 
in other ways. For example, the code abolished the institution of habus. The habus system was 
often used to keep property within the agnatic kinship network by excluding female heirs or 
making them temporary beneficiaries.64 Donating a habus allowed the patrilineal kin group to 
retain its property. By abolishing the system of habus, the code removed this mechanism to 
deprive women of their inheritance rights.  
 The code also introduced regulations for the procedure of wills. Wills could no longer be 
made orally, but had to written, dated, and signed in order to be valid. An important change was 
introduced in regard to the children of a predeceased daughter specifically. As stipulated in 
Islamic law, a will could transfer no more than one-third of an individual’s assets, with the 
remaining two-thirds distributed to specified heirs. Previously, in the case that a man’s daughter 
had died and left a child, the child of the predeceased daughter could not be the beneficiary of 
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his will, whereas the child of a predeceased son could. In contrast, the new code permitted a 
man to make the child of a predeceased daughter a beneficiary of his will, thus transferring one 
third of his assets to the female line. In a society in which the male line had been 
overwhelmingly privileged in inheritance, this constituted a significant change for female kin. 
 Two other reforms were introduced that restricted the inheritance privileges of agnatic 
relatives to the benefit of female relatives. First, the code significantly expanded the inheritance 
rights of the spouse. Under Maliki law, if there were no agnatic heirs, the remainder of an 
individual’s heritage after specified heirs had received their share went to the state or to a public 
fund. This issue was handled differently under Hanafi law, but also in a way that disadvantaged 
the spouse. Under Hanafi law, if there were no agnatic heirs, the remainder of the heritage was 
distributed among heirs according to the shares specified in the Shari’a. The spouse, however, 
was excluded from this rule of “return.”  
 Abandoning Maliki principles, the code adopted the system of return and permitted the 
spouse to be a recipient.65 The implications of this reform were significant. Under the new law, 
an individual’s inheritance in its entirety would now go to the spouse, whether male or female. 
This reform was another indication of the tendency of the new code to extend inheritance rights 
to members of the conjugal family over the extended patrilineage.  
 Second, and more dramatically, the code shifted the direction of property transmission to 
the conjugal family at the expense of extended kin. The new laws permitted women to either 
take precedence over agnatic heirs or to exclude them from inheritance altogether, stipulating 
that “the daughter and the granddaughter in the male line benefit from ‘return’ even in the 
presence of agnatic relatives in the category of brothers, paternal uncles, and their 
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descendants.”66 If a man died and left a daughter and a brother or a paternal uncle, under the 
new law the daughter would now inherit the entire patrimony, excluding from inheritance the 
brother or the paternal uncle of the deceased. Whereas under Maliki law the daughter would 
have received only half of the patrimony—and the other half would have been distributed to 
agnatic relatives—a woman now received twice as much as she previously did. Moreover, upon 
the daughter’s death, the property she had inherited would then pass to her children, thereby 
evading agnatic kin altogether.   
 As a whole, the PSC has been interpreted as favoring women. Like other areas of the 
code, the inheritance law reforms expanded women’s rights in significant ways. Importantly, 
however, the reforms also served to sanction the nuclear family. What was striking about the 
new inheritance laws was not only that women now excluded men from inheritance in certain 
cases, but that it was a particular category of male kin who were excluded: extended male 
relatives, including brothers, paternal uncles, and their children. Nonetheless, the new laws did 
not allow women to exclude the immediate male relatives of the deceased, including fathers, 
sons, or grandsons.67 
 What is important about the inheritance reforms is that they privileged descendants of 
both sexes—not just women—over extended kin. The reforms did not directly favor women as 
such. In the transmission of property, a child—whether male or female—was now prioritized 
over other kin, even if the other kin were male relatives. The male relatives that were excluded 
from inheritance in the new laws, including brothers, uncles, and cousins, “constituted the 
center of the circle within which relations of solidarity and reciprocal obligations were 
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historically emphasized in the Maghrebi kin group.”68 The inheritance reforms represented a 
strengthening of the conjugal family to the disadvantage of the extended patrilineal kin group.  
 In sum, the PSC made drastic reforms to Islamic family law. As a whole, the code 
diverged from Islamic law in its conception of the family and in its specific regulations of kin 
relations. In regard to inheritance, it modified certain inheritance rules to favor the spouse and 
immediate descendants, including women, over agnatic relatives. These modifications 
represented a significant departure from the kin relations traditionally sanctioned in Islamic law. 
However, the code remained largely faithful to Islamic law and kept gender inequality in 
inheritance intact. 
Upon the promulgation of the PSC, the government undertook extensive efforts to 
explain the family law reforms to the Tunisian population and to enforce their application. 
Judges were designated as social educators whose task was not only to apply the new laws, but 
to make the modifications to family life contained within the new family law understandable to 
Tunisian citizens. Conferences and seminars were also organized to explain and provide 
clarifications of the code, and national organizations were encouraged to partake in carrying out 
the social transformations that the code entailed. The PSC became a national project to which 
both citizens and the government were to contribute.69 
Family Law Reform to the Present  
 The PSC constituted a radical reinterpretation of Islamic family law and laid the groundwork for 
further legal reforms that have placed Tunisia at the forefront of the Arab world in gender equality. The 
second major phase of family law reform occurred in 1993 under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who 
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succeeded Bourguiba as president in 1987. The 1993 family law reforms centered around the Tunisian 
Code of Nationality and concerned women’s citizenship rights specifically. Among the privileges 
conferred on agnatic relatives in family law, the patrilineage was historically privileged as the 
determinant of Tunisia nationality. Membership in the Tunisian political community passed directly 
from the male line.70 In a considerable departure from traditional citizenship law, the reforms 
designated mothers as a source of citizenship in addition to fathers. For the first time, a woman could 
pass Tunisian nationality to a child regardless of the nationality of the father. The reforms were widely 
praised both in and beyond Tunisia for advancing women’s rights and challenging the privileged status 
of the patrilineage. Importantly, women’s activism played an important role in implementing the 
reforms. Women’s organizations had emerged in Tunisia in the 1980s and 1990s, and in contrast to the 
promulgation of the PSC, women’s rights advocates were active in the public debates leading up to the 
reforms.71  
Recent developments in Tunisia suggest that a new phase of family law reform is underway. In 
the wake of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution—the anti-government uprising in Tunisia which toppled Ben 
Ali’s regime and resulted in Tunisia’s democratization—the Tunisian government has taken significant 
measures to instate gender equality in the law. In 2014, Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly adopted a new 
constitution which declares male and female citizens equal before the law and made gender parity on 
electoral lists mandatory. Article 21 of the Constitution states that women and men “have equal rights 
and duties and are equal before the law without any discrimination,” and in fulfillment of this article, 
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political parties are now required to alternate the members of their candidate lists between men and 
women.72  
In 2017, Beji Caid Essebsi—the leader of the secularist party Nidaa Tounes who became 
Tunisia’s first president in 2014—passed a landmark law criminalizing domestic violence against 
women. The law removed a clause in the penal code that allowed rapists to escape punishment if they 
agreed to marry their victims, making Tunisia the first Arab-Muslim country to abolish the rape-
marriage law.73 Later in 2017, Essebsi overturned a law prohibiting Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslim men, also making Tunisia the first Arab-Muslim country to remove legal barriers to women 
marrying outside the state religion.74 At the same time, Essebsi announced a proposal to review 
Tunisia’s inheritance, advocating the elimination of gender inequality in inheritance.   
Essebsi announced the proposal with the public endorsement of Diwan al-Ifta, Tunisia’s highest 
religious establishment, which described the proposal as “reinforcing women’s position and 
guaranteeing the principle of equality between men and women in rights and obligations that is called 
for in our religion and in the Hanafi Sunni doctrine.”75 Nonetheless, the proposal sparked controversy 
both in Tunisia and throughout the Arab world. Religious authorities at Al-Azhar, the university in 
Cairo considered the highest authority of Sunni Islam, condemned the proposal as counter to Islamic 
law. Al-Azhar scholars stated that gender equality in inheritance is “undebatable,” “contradicted Islamic 
edicts,” that the regulation of inheritance in Islam is determined by Shari’a law with “no space for 
independent reasoning or uncertainty,” and that Tunisia’s proposal “shakes the stable foundation of the 
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Muslim community.”76 Opponents within Tunisia suggested that Tunisia faces more pressing issues 
than inheritance equality, and some claimed that inheritance equality is part of a foreign political 
agenda.77 
Despite the controversy, Essebsi took a preliminary step towards inheritance reform in August 
2017 by launching the Commission of Individual Freedoms and Equality (COLIBE), an independent 
committee tasked with recommending legal reforms to bring Tunisian law in accordance with the 
principles of the new Constitution and with international human rights standards. The Commission 
published its first report in June 2018, identifying Tunisian laws that undermine or violate individual 
freedoms and equality and recommending specific legal reforms. In regard to family law, the 
Commission recommended eliminating the provision of the Personal Status Code according to which 
women receive half as much inheritance as men.78 
In a more tangible step towards reform, in August 2018 Essebsi pledged to introduce a bill to 
Parliament to instate gender equality in inheritance. Describing inheritance equality as long overdue, 
Essebsi claimed that “this should have been done in 1956 but the constitution did not provide for it 
then.”79 Notably, however, Essebsi’s proposal stopped short of advocating full inheritance equality. 
Families who wish to continue observing the existing inheritance law can opt out of inheritance equality 
by formally expressing their wish to do so in their will in front of a notary.80 The bill was approved by 
Essebsi’s cabinet in November 2018 and sent to Tunisia’s parliament to be debated and ratified.  
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Islam and Family Law in a Global Context  
Before turning to the literature review in Chapter Three, it is useful to briefly 
contextualize Tunisia in the global landscape of Islamic law and inheritance law reform. An 
appreciation of the application of Shari’a law throughout the Islamic world as well as the 
global landscape of inheritance law reform sheds light on important similarities and 
differences between Tunisia and countries in the Islamic world that have legally instated 
gender equality in inheritance.  
Map 1: Application of Shari’a in Muslim-Majority Countries 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Shari’a courts 
Shari’a courts adjudicate family and personal status matters 
Shari’a law applies in full to both personal status and criminal matters 
Regional variations in the application of Shari’a 
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Map 2: Role of Islam in Muslim-Majority Countries as Outlined in Constitutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Gender Equality in Inheritance in Muslim-Majority Countries81 
 
Country   Region  Legal System State Religion 
Albania   Eastern Europe Secular  None 
Azerbaijan   Western Asia  Secular  None 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Eastern Europe Secular  None 
Chad    Central Africa Secular  None 
Kazakhstan   Central Asia  Secular  None 
Kosovo    Eastern Europe  Secular  None 
Kyrgyzstan   Central Asia  Secular  None 
Mali    West Africa  Secular  None 
Mozambique   Southern Africa Secular  None 
Tajikistan   Central Asia  Secular  None 
Turkey    Western Asia  Secular  None 
Turkmenistan   Central Asia  Secular  None 
 
 
                                                        
81 I have included Mozambique in this table, where the population is 45% Muslim. 
Islamic State  
Islam is the religion of the state  
Unclear/no declaration 
Secular State 
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Shari’a Law and Political Institutions   
Shari’a law is applied to state laws in at least some form in 53 Muslim countries 
across the globe as well as a number of non-Muslim countries. The term Shari’a has come 
to stand for a broad range of applications of the law in Muslim-majority countries. In 
general, Shari’a has been incorporated into, or removed from, political systems throughout 
the Islamic world in three main ways.82 
First, in approximately twenty-three Muslim countries, the state has declared the law 
to be completely secular and does not operate Shari’a courts. Countries that implement 
completely secular legal systems include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Tunisia, Senegal, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mozambique.83 
It is noteworthy that the Central Asia countries were all former republics of the Soviet 
Union, which outlawed religion in the region for three quarters of a century until its 
collapse in 1991. It is also noteworthy that Tunisia is the only Arab country that 
implements a secular legal system.  
 Second, many Muslim countries implement a dual system in which the state applies 
secular law but the operation of Shari’a courts is permitted to adjudicate family and 
personal status issues for Muslim citizens. While the exact jurisdiction of Shari’a courts 
varies by country, it typically encompasses matters of marriage, divorce, guardianship, and 
inheritance. Kenya and Nigeria, for example, operate Shari’a courts that adjudicate personal 
status issues for Muslim citizens.84 In a different variation, Tanzania operates a civil court 
                                                        
82 Ashlea Hollman, “The Convergence of International Human Rights and Sharia Law,” New York State Bar Association. 
83 Ibid. 
84 “Islam: Governing Under Shari’a,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 25, 2014. 
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system which applies either secular or Shari’a law according to the religious background of 
the defendant. Approximately thirty-two countries implement this form, including Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya, Gambia, Comoros, Somalia, Djibouti, Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. 
Third, a number of Muslim countries implement a “classical Shari’a” system in 
which Islam is the official religion of the state and Shari’a serves as the foundation of the 
legal system. Fifteen countries implement this form of Sharia’ law, including Egypt, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, certain regions in Indonesia, the Maldives, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In these 
countries, Shari’a law influences the entire legal system, including the areas of family and 
criminal law. In Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, it is also forbidden to enact any legislation that is 
antithetical to Islam.85 
Notably, Tunisia is unique among Muslim countries in that Islam is the official religion of the 
state, but the state implements a secular legal system. While the constitution of Tunisia declares that the 
country’s “religion is Islam,” the government is the “guardian of religion,” and requires that the 
president be Muslim, the state has abolished the operation of Shari’a courts. 
Tunisia is the only state in the Maghreb that does not operate Shari’a courts for family and 
personal status issues. Morocco, for example, implements a dual system in which secular courts 
adjudicate civil and criminal matters while Shari’a courts adjudicate personal status law. The Algerian 
legal system is also based on a civil law system adapted from the colonial period in which Shari’a courts 
adjudicate personal status law. Beyond the Maghreb, Tunisia is also the only state in the Middle East 
and North Africa in addition to Turkey that implements a completely secular legal system.  
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Inheritance Reform Throughout the Islamic World  
 Limited progress has been made in inheritance reform in the Islamic world, although 
notable progress has recently been made in other aspects of family law such as marriage and 
divorce. While attempts to reform the Shari’a have been made, they have been largely 
unsuccessful. 
 Turkey is the only country in the Middle East and North Africa that has legally instated 
gender equality in inheritance. Almost a century ago in 1926, Kemal Atatürk implemented 
sweeping legal reforms in Turkey that greatly expanded women’s rights in family and personal 
status issues. After gaining Turkish independence in 1922, Atatürk attempted to modernize 
Turkish society by launching a program of revolutionary political, social, cultural, and legal 
reforms. Among these reforms, Atatürk abolished Shari’a courts and introduced a secular civil 
code that expanded women’s rights in family and personal status issues, including granting 
women equal rights in inheritance.86 Again, it is noteworthy that no Arab country has legally 
instated gender equality in inheritance.  
 Beyond the Middle East, Albania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Chad, Mali, and Mozambique have 
formally instated gender equality in inheritance in the law, although the application of the law 
varies significantly by country. In all of these countries, the state has no official religion and 
implements a completely secular legal system.  
 In sum, Tunisia is the only country in the Middle East and North Africa in addition 
to Turkey that implements a secular legal system. It is distinctive, however, in that while the 
state abolished Shari’a courts, Islam is nonetheless the official religion of the state. In addition, 
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Turkey is the only country in the Middle East that has legally instated gender equality in 
inheritance. A number of Muslim countries in Central Asia and throughout Africa have also 
legally instated inheritance equality; no Arab country, however, has successfully reformed 
Shari’a inheritance law.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the background information necessary to understand this 
thesis on family law reform in Tunisia, the status of family law in Islam, and the landscape of 
family law in the Islamic world. It overviewed the history of modern Tunisia and Tunisia’s 
distinctive path to family law reform, highlighting how both broad historical developments and 
specific state building activities paved the way for family law reform. It also discussed the status 
of family law in Islam and the role of family law in defining the organization of power in society, 
focusing on the status of inheritance law in Islam and how Islamic inheritance law privileges the 
cohesion of the patrilineal kin group. In addition, the chapter overviewed family law reform in 
Tunisia from independence to the present, emphasizing how the changes to inheritance law in 
the 1956 Personal Status Code were not as striking as in other areas of family law. Finally, it 
briefly contextualized Tunisia in the global landscape of Islamic law and inheritance reform. In 
the following chapter, I review the literature on gender and the state in the Middle East to 
identify existing explanations for the research question of this thesis.  
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3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The answer to the research question of this thesis draws on several bodies of existing 
literature which focus on political, social, and ideological factors respectively as critical variables 
that shapes state policy on family law. This chapter reviews the literature on gender and the state 
the Middle East to identify existing explanations of state policy on family law as well as highlight 
current gaps in the literature. The first section reviews scholarship on gender and state building 
in the Middle East. I highlight the inability of theoretical frameworks which view family law 
policy as a product of the state building process to explain the variation within Tunisia’s family 
law reform. The second section reviews scholarship on the patriarchal practices of Middle 
Eastern states. I emphasize that theoretical frameworks which view family law policy as a 
reflection of the patriarchal interests of the state highlight the important social and economic 
implications of family law reform but cannot fully explain the inconsistencies within Tunisia’s 
reforms. The third section reviews scholarship on the relationship between religion and the state 
in the Middle East. I suggest that theoretical frameworks which view family law policy as shaped 
by state ideology with respect to religion provide a key perspective on this research question. 
The chapter concludes with the argument assessed in the remainder of this thesis.  
 
Gender and State Building  
The literature on gender and state building in the Middle East offers an important 
perspective on family law policy. This section discusses theories of state formation in kin-based 
societies that view state-tribe relations as the critical variable shaping state policy on family law. 
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It focuses primarily on Mounira Charrad’s work States and Women’s Rights: The Making of 
Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, which is the major work on gender and state building in 
the Maghreb and offers one of the most cited hypotheses on this topic.   
State Formation in Kin-Based Societies  
Kin-based social organization and the power of tribes in the political sphere were defining 
characteristics of the social and political context in which postcolonial state formation took place in the 
Maghreb.87 Like much of the postcolonial world, focal points of solidarity in Maghrebi societies were 
concentrated in local collectivities rather than in nation-wide institutions. A major challenge confronting 
postcolonial states in the Maghreb was to establish national institutions in the fragmented social context 
inherited from colonial rule. State formation created tensions with local collectivities as states attempted 
to extend control over the territory of the nation-state. From a state building perspective, the challenge 
of state formation in the Maghreb was to integrate tribal collectivities into the new nation-state.   
In analyzing state formation, it is necessary to establish a definition of the state and the 
nation. According to Max Weber, a state is an institution that claims the authority to make 
binding decisions for all, on the monopoly of force, and over a determinate territory.88 The 
modern state is usually associated with an administrative apparatus. State formation therefore 
involves the extension of a central administrative control over a fixed territory and the 
maintenance of state authority within its boundaries.  
Nation-building refers to the development of a collective identity and the integration of 
separate social collectivities into a unified society.89 The relationship between state formation 
and nation-building is complex and highly variable. While countries often pursue state formation 
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and nation-building at once, some have a cohesive national identity when they begin to develop 
a central state, and others develop a national identity only after the development of a central 
state.  
There is a direct conflict between local solidarities such as tribes, clans, or religious 
communities and the nation-state because each institution represents an alternative center of 
power and social control. State formation in kin-based societies requires the redirection of 
resources previously concentrated in local collectivities to national institutions. As the state seeks 
to redirect resources away from local collectivities, it challenges communal ties and embedded 
forms of social organization. The relationship between local solidarities and the nation-state is 
therefore typically characterized by ongoing tension.90  
In terms of social organization, the tribe or kin group is critical in the Maghreb because it 
has historically constituted the basic social unit of society. A shared feature between the 
Maghreb and other Middle Eastern societies is their origin in tribal structures. As Nikki Keddie 
suggests, when analyzing the history of the Maghreb, it is necessary to consider how tribes have 
affected the society as a whole.91 
From this perspective, the Maghrebi experience of state formation can be viewed as a 
history of tension between a group holding power in the political center and autonomous local 
collectivities resisting its control. Precolonial states in the Maghreb grew or declined depending 
on the degree of control they could assert over tribal areas in the territorial periphery. Tribes 
coexisted with partially bureaucratic centers that had shifting boundaries and often lacked strong 
local administrations.92 In Keddie’s view, Middle Eastern history could be reconstructed by 
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analyzing the “various permutations and combinations of a nomadic-agricultural-urban 
synthesis.”93 
State-Tribe Relations and Family Law Reform 
Building on this approach, Mounira Charrad argues that state building strategy as shaped 
by the relationship between states and tribes has been critical in shaping family law policy in 
postcolonial Maghrebi states. In her influential work States and Women’s Rights, Charrad asks why 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia followed different paths with respect to family law in the wake of 
independence even though all three states emerged from similar colonial contexts. She argues 
that the relationship between states and tribes, specifically the degree of state autonomy from 
kin-based solidarities, was the critical variable shaping state policy on family law in each state.  
Charrad highlights that family law was politically relevant to tribal kin groups insofar as 
family law sanctions a particular form of social organization and distribution of power in society. 
Islamic law offers a vision of society in which the patrilineal kin group constitutes the basic form 
of social organization and the authoritative political unit. Tribes therefore favored Islamic law 
because it sanctions tribal structures. The fate of tribal structures was bound to that of Islamic 
law insofar as tribes could be either integrated into or eliminated from the nation-state 
depending on the family law policy adopted by the state.   
Thus, to explain family law reform in Tunisia, Charrad argues that unlike in Morocco or 
Algeria, the Tunisian state developed in relative autonomy from tribal groups and could 
therefore adopt a family law that altered the traditional model of the kin group. The Tunisian 
state sought to reform family law, moreover, because in reforming family law it could restructure 
society so that tribal groups no longer served as a focal point of solidarity. The political 
                                                        
93 Ibid., 22.  
 47 
 
leadership therefore pursued family law reform as part of a broader agenda to consolidate the 
authority of the modern state.     
The theoretical framework Charrad develops to analyze family law policy focuses on 
long-term historical trajectories and strategies of the political leadership. Charrad’s framework 
calls attention to how structural conditions delineated the range of options and strategies 
available to political leadership as it made alliances in seeking political authority. Overall, 
Charrad treats family law as part of the state building agenda. Her analysis views family law 
reform as part of the state’s broader attempt to restructure social organization and the 
distribution of power in society as a whole.  
Theoretical Implications of the State Building Framework  
Charrad offers a convincing explanation of cross-national variation in state policies on 
family law in the Maghreb. Her argument explains why Tunisia was able to implement radical 
family law reforms in the wake of independence while Algeria and Morocco were not. What 
Charrad does not analyze, however, is the variation within Tunisia’s reforms. Charrad notes that 
the stipulations on inheritance appeared incongruent with the character of the reforms as a 
whole but does not offer an explanation for this inconsistency in the reforms.   
This gap in Charrad’s analysis is significant because the variation within Tunisia’s reforms 
suggests that there were constraints on the state that Charrad does not account for. It is possible 
either that Charrad overestimates the weakness of tribal structures in the wake of independence 
and that tribes were able to exert pressure on the state with respect to inheritance law, or that 
another variable exerted pressure on the state altogether. 
I argue the latter. It is unlikely that societal actors such as tribal leaders were able to exert 
pressure on the state in the lawmaking process. The influence of tribes in the political sphere 
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had been significantly weakened under colonial rule, and given that the text of the PSC was 
developed by state elites without being debated in national assembly, it is not clear how tribal 
actors could have exerted pressure on the state in the process of drafting the code. Given their 
diminished bargaining power, moreover, it is also not clear why tribal actors would have sought 
to the preserve inheritance law specifically over other areas of Islamic family law that implicated 
the political power of tribes more directly. 
In sum, the literature on gender and state building in the Middle East emphasizes state 
building strategy as shaped by the relationship between states and tribes as the critical variable 
shaping state policy on family law. State building perspectives highlight the influence of tribal 
politics on policy outcomes and are useful to explain cross-national variation in state policies on 
family law. However, the state building approach cannot account for the variation within 
Tunisia’s reforms. Tribal politics do not explain why Tunisia preserved Islamic inheritance law 
while reforming almost all other areas of family law after independence.  
 
The Patriarchal State and Family 
Charrad’s theoretical focus on state-tribe relations departs from a second prevailing 
approach to analyzing family law policy in the Middle East: the gendered and patriarchal 
practices of the state. The state building perspective argues that family law defines the 
organization of power in society. From this perspective, what is key to understanding the family 
law reforms in Tunisia is that they strengthened the conjugal family at the expense of the 
extended kin group in order to reorganize the distribution of power in society.  
Were there elements of traditional social organization, however, that the post-
independence state sought to preserve? That is, were there continuities between the distribution 
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of power in society sanctioned by Islamic law and the distribution of power in society 
envisioned by the post-independence state that compelled it to preserve Islamic inheritance law? 
A perspective focusing on the gendered and patriarchal practices of the state might suggest that 
Tunisia preserved Islamic inheritance law because the political leadership sought to maintain 
forms of patriarchal privilege in modern society. Preserving Islamic inheritance law served this 
end insofar as it preserved the social and economic power of men.  
It is noteworthy that the PSC continued to identify the husband as the head of the family 
and to designate the husband as responsible for supporting his wife and children. The code also 
continued to proscribe women from passing Tunisian nationality or their family name to their 
children, and to prohibit Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men.94 The preservation of 
patriarchal privilege in other areas of the code supports the idea that the patriarchal interests of 
the state shaped Tunisia’s family law policy. From this perspective, the preservation of Islamic 
inheritance law appears less puzzling when considered alongside other areas of the code that 
maintained patriarchal privilege.  
There is a broad literature on the gendered and patriarchal practices of Middle Eastern 
states. This section overviews theories of the patriarchal state and family that view family law 
policy as a reflection of the patriarchal interests of state and society. 
Patriarchal Society and Family  
The “Middle Eastern Muslim family” has long been viewed as a patriarchal unit, and it 
has been noted that Islamic family law serves to reinforce patriarchal gender relations within the 
family. The persistence of patriarchy in contemporary societies is a matter of debate, and some 
feminist scholars argue that patriarchy exists in industrialized societies. For example, Sylvia 
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Walby distinguishes between the “private patriarchy” of the premodern family and the “public 
patriarchy” of the state and labor market in industrialized societies. Carol Patemen, on the other 
hand, argues that patriarchy is specific to the premodern historical period, and that in the 
modern liberal state, patriarchy has developed into a “fraternity” in which men have the right to 
rule over women in the private sphere but agree on a social contract of equality in the public 
sphere. John Caldwell and Deniz Kandiyoti, in contrast, locates patriarchy in a specific 
geographical zone—“the patriarchal belt”—characterized by kin-based agrarian societies. 
The family is one of the only societal institutions that is often conceptualized as essential 
or natural.95 The biological basis of kin relations and women’s reproductive capacities have 
historically contributed to this perception. This emphasis on biology has led to a functionalist 
view of the family among many sociologists which transcends culture. For example, Talcott 
Parsons argues that the modern family serves two primary functions: to socialize children into 
society’s normative system of values and to provide a stable emotional environment that will 
cushion male workers from the psychological damage of alienation in the workplace.96 
Specifically, these functions are carried out by the wife and mother, who serves the “affective” 
role of nurturer while the husband serves the “instrumental” role of earning the family’s income 
and maintaining discipline. Valentine Moghadam suggests that Parsons’s characterization of the 
family aligns closely with a contemporary Muslim view, which sees the family as “the 
fundamental unit of society and stresses the mother’s role in the socialization of children—
particularly in raising ‘committed Muslims’ and transmitting cultural values.”97 
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Patriarchal society is a precapitalistic form of social organization in which property, 
residence, and descent pass through the male line. In Kandiyoti’s “classic patriarchy,” the senior 
man has authority over all other members of the family including younger men, and women are 
subject to distinct forms of subordination and control. As Kandiyoti notes, the key to the 
reproduction of classic patriarchy lies in the operations of the extended patrilineal kin group. 
The subordination of women in kin-based societies is linked to the reproduction of the extended 
kin group insofar as childbearing is the central female labor activity. Moreover, just as in 
capitalism what a worker produces is not viewed as the property of the worker, in a patriarchal 
context a woman’s products—whether children or commodities—are not considered her 
property, but rather those of the kin group and especially male kin. Male dominance is thus 
embedded in the social and economic structure of patriarchal societies.98 
Like Christianity and Judaism, Islam arose in a patriarchal society.99 Germaine Tillion 
argued that the origin of women’s oppression in Muslim societies can be traced to the 
beginnings of patrilineal society. She identified the practice of endogamy, or marrying within the 
lineage, as the origin of women’s oppression in patrilineal society long before the advent of 
Islam. Endogamy was important to patrilineal society because it maintained property within the 
patrilineage and thereby protected the economic and political interests of men. Tillion points out 
that Qur’anic reforms in fact provided women with certain legal rights absent in Judaism and 
Christianity as well as with protections absent in pre-Islamic Arabian society. For example, Islam 
banned female infanticide and entitled women to contract their marriage, receive dower, manage 
their private property, and receive shares in inheritance. Tillion suggests that norms and laws 
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developed in the first centuries of Islam that granted male kin control over key aspects of 
women’s lives were an attempt to meet a woman’s needs in a society in which her domestic and 
childbearing roles rendered her dependent on male relatives.  
The “belt of classic patriarchy” as Caldwell characterizes it includes areas stretching from 
North Africa and the Middle East to South and East Asia. In a contemporary context, tribal 
structure continues to represent the archetype of patriarchal organization and can still be found 
throughout the Central Asia and in parts of the Arab world and eastern Turkey.100 The social 
organization of the tribe is based on blood ties and is patriarchal in the classic sense. Tribal 
identity is based on notions of common patrilineal descent. Germaine Tillion and Nikki Keddie 
both point out that endogamy increases the tendency to maintain property within families 
through the control of women in tightly interrelated lineages. Tribal societies, they suggest, 
therefore have “special reasons” to want to control woman in order to preserve the economic 
interests of men.101 
Patriarchal States and Family Law  
Building on this approach, Valentine Moghadam offers a Marxist-feminist perspective on 
state policy on family law in the Middle East that places the patriarchal state at the center of the 
analysis of state policy. In Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, 
Moghadam seeks to explain the causes and direction of social change in the Middle East and 
North Africa, especially as they have affected women’s status and social position. Her central 
argument is that the gender and class systems are the key structural determinants of state policy 
on family law.102  
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Marxist-feminists originally used the term “sexual division of labor” to refer to the 
ideological and material organization of the family, the workplace, and the society which 
originate in sexual difference between women and men, particularly in women’s reproductive 
capacity. Early Marxist-feminist theorists argued that patriarchy—or the system of male 
dominance over women—has historically coexisted with modes of production and that 
women’s status has therefore been shaped by both the sexual division of labor and class 
divisions within modes of production.  
In contemporary scholarship, the term “gender” is used more broadly to refer to the 
meanings ascribed to the feminine and masculine, asymmetrical power relations between women 
and men, and the ways in which women and men are differently situated in and affected by 
social processes. Judith Lorber defines gender as “a process of social construction, a system of 
social stratification, and an institution that structures every aspect of our lives because of its 
embeddedness in the family, the workplace, and the state.”103 
Combining Marxist-feminist analysis with sociological perspectives, Moghadam’s analysis 
of state policies on gender focuses on the ways in which gender systems are constituted by social 
and political structures. Gender systems, Moghadam suggests, are differently manifested under 
different material conditions as well as under different types of political regimes. State policies 
on gender vary significantly among kin-based, agrarian, developing, and advanced industrialized 
societies as well as among Marxist, liberal democratic, social democratic, and neopatriarchal 
states. Gender systems therefore are not static. Rather, they are reconstructed to adapt to 
changing political and material conditions in society.  
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 Fatima Mernissi’s work highlights the sexual division of labor in Muslim societies, 
especially as it occurs within the family. Islam privileges patrilineal ties and identifies men as 
responsible to support their wives and children. In the Arab-Islamic family, according to 
Mernissi, the wife’s primary obligations are to maintain a home, bear and care for her children, 
and obey her husband. The husband, in turn, is entitled to exercise his authority within the 
marital bond by restricting his wife’s movements and appearance in public. Moghadam refers to 
this system described by Mernissi as the “patriarchal gender contract.”104 The patriarchal 
contract, Moghadam she, is both realized within the family and codified by the state in family 
law. Outside of the domestic sphere, the source of patriarchal control is thus politico-juridical: 
patriarchal control is exercised through state and legal institutions.105  
 Critically, Moghadam suggests that political regimes in the Middle East can be 
characterized as “neopatriarchal” states. Neopatriarchy describes modernized patriarchy, or the 
product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in a capitalistic context.106 Whether 
Middle Eastern states are monarchies or republics or led by radical or conservative political 
leadership, she suggests, they share the essential features of neopatriarchy and are rooted in the 
patriarchal values and social relations.  
From this perspective, Moghadam argues that changes to family law policy in the Middle 
East reflect the state’s attempt to construct a new form of patriarchy suitable to a modern 
capitalist context. Family law policy reflects the interest of the state in preserving patriarchal 
values and social relations in modern society. Thus, insofar as patriarchal control is exercised 
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through state and legal institutions, the state attempts to construct and reproduce patriarchy 
through the medium of the law.  
Moghadam’s theoretical framework focuses on broad social-structural conditions and 
how they inform the interests of the state to explain what shapes family law policy. Overall, 
Moghadam treats changes to family law as a reflection the state’s inherent interest in preserving 
patriarchal power in modern society. Her analysis views family law reform as part of the state’s 
broader attempt to adapt traditional patriarchal structures to modern political and material 
conditions.   
Gender and the Family in Islamic Law 
 Judith Tucker offers a similar perspective on how family law policy is shaped by social-
structural conditions that addresses their effects on property and inheritance law specifically. In 
Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, Tucker examines how women and men have been 
constructed as gendered subjects through Islamic law throughout the history of the Islamic legal 
tradition. To explain why earlier jurists were unable to resolve doctrinal tensions in property and 
inheritance law in regard to the legal status of women, she argues that reformist jurists 
confronted the reality of family and societal expectations of patriarchal gender roles.  
Tucker highlights how Islamic law is concerned to a significant degree with how property 
should be managed, transferred, and made to benefit its owners. The legal instrument most 
essential to property management—the contract—occupies a central status in the Islamic legal 
system.107 The right of the individual to manage and dispose of their property through the 
contract is recognized and upheld in distinctive ways by Islamic law.  
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 In many ways, she notes, Muslim jurists have historically made little distinction between 
women and men in their extensive discussions of the rules for handling property.108 Whether 
buying, selling, endowing, or generally managing or disposing of property, any adult of age was 
considered a legal subject fully entitled to enter into contracts and exercise independent control 
over their property. Unlike much of the Western legal tradition, the marital status of a woman 
had no impact on her legal competence to acquire, manage, or dispose of property according to 
Islamic law.109 
 Although women’s rights to manage and dispose of their property were largely identical 
to those of men, the Islamic legal tradition stipulated gender as key to the acquisition of property 
in ways that both benefitted and disadvantaged women. For example, the law specified that a 
wife should receive a dower from her husband as part of the marriage contract that became an 
undifferentiated part of her private property and could not be accessed or managed by any male 
relative.110 The privileged female access to property through the dower system was 
counterbalanced, however, by inheritance laws that restricted the shares of inheritance of 
females and relatives in the maternal line.111 In this way, Tucker suggests, Islamic law contained 
significant doctrinal tension in regard to the status of women and men as legal subjects and what 
role women should play in the legal system. 
Tucker observes that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformists jurists in 
many parts of the Middle East engaged with the question of the female subject in order to 
explain, and in certain cases amend, the differences between women and men as legal actors. 
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Specifically, many jurists sought to address doctrinal tension in the issue of inheritance, 
especially the prescription that stipulated that a woman’s share of inheritance is half that of a 
man’s. Ultimately, however, reformist jurists did not attempt to alter the inheritance laws.  
To explain why inheritance laws remained unchanged, Tucker suggests that when a 
woman’s property entitlements were considered as a whole—including dower, maintenance, and 
the absence of any responsibility to support her family financially—women stood to acquire 
more property through Islamic rules of property transfer than men.112 Importantly, this 
guarantee of equity in the law was based on the idea of a woman as a wife and mother whose 
disadvantage in inheritance was counterbalanced by collecting dower and support payments.113 
The concept of the equal female subject, she argues, was therefore trumped in practice by the 
reality that family and societal expectations of gender roles limited women’s rights under the 
law.114 The idea that women were wives and mothers whose primary role in society lay in the 
domestic sphere was justified discriminatory practices in family law, including unequal 
inheritance. Women’s rights were infringed upon “where their identities as daughters, wives, and 
mothers intruded.”115 
Like Moghadam, Tucker’s focuses on the social-structural conditions that shape family 
law policy, especially the interaction between the gender and legal systems. Tucker treat’s family 
law policy as a reflection of the structure of patriarchal society. Overall, Tucker’s analysis views 
state policy on family law as a part of the broader gender system mediating the relationship 
between state and society.   
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Theoretical Implications of the State Building Framework for Family Law Reform 
Moghadam and Tucker offer important perspectives on the gendered and patriarchal 
practices of Middle Eastern states. Both scholars’ perspectives sharpen our understanding of the 
variables that shape state policies on family law in the Middle East. Moghadam’s argument in 
particular offers a strong explanation of how gender and class systems interact in shaping family 
law policy. However, with their emphasis on sociological and historical analysis, both 
frameworks share a similar weakness with the state building perspective: they are useful to 
highlight structural forces that shape family law policy, but they cannot account for specific 
variations within state policy. Like the state building perspective, a gender system approach can 
explain cross-national variation in state policies on family law and why patriarchal structures 
persist in certain kinds of states, but they cannot explain inconsistency within a state’s family law.  
It is important to emphasize that Tunisia did reform other laws on inheritance 
implicating patriarchal privilege in significant and unprecedented ways. The state expanded the 
rights of female kin who had traditionally been excluded from inheritance in a way that tangibly 
diminished the privileges of male kin. While certain polices varied with some being more 
patriarchal than others, the family law reforms as a whole strengthened women’s rights to the 
social and economic disadvantage of the patrilineal kin group. This weakens the explanatory 
power of a framework that points to the interest of the state in preserving patriarchy to explain 
the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia. Social-structural frameworks do not 
provide the analytical precision necessary to explain why the state reduced patriarchal privilege 
in other areas of family law and even in certain areas of inheritance law while preserving the 
provision on inheritance inequality specifically.  
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In sum, the literature on the gendered and patriarchal practices of Middle Eastern states 
emphasizes the patriarchal interests of the state as the critical variable shaping state policy on 
family law. Perspectives focusing on gendered interests highlight the important social and 
economic implications of family law reform. However, the gender system approach cannot 
account for the inconsistencies within Tunisia’s reforms. The state’s interest in maintaining 
patriarchal privilege cannot explain why Tunisia preserved the prescription on inheritance 
inequality specifically while reforming almost all other areas of Islamic family law. 
 
Ideology and Nation-Building 
In considering the region of the Middle East, it is surprising that scholars have largely 
overlooked a third approach to analyzing state policy on family law: the relationship between 
religion and the state. Given that Islam, like patriarchy, is a defining characteristic of Middle 
Eastern societies, the relationship between religion and the state seems to be an important factor 
to consider in analyzing state policy on Islamic family law.  
It should be emphasized that are multiple ways to frame what was puzzling about the 
preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia. This is due to the fact that family law reform in an 
Islamic context can be viewed as pursuing multiple goals. On one hand, as the state building 
perspectives suggests, the preservation of Islamic inheritance law was surprising because it seemed 
inconsistent with expansion of women’s rights at the expense of the patrilineal kin group in other areas 
of family law. From this perspective, the inheritance laws were puzzling because they seemed 
incongruent with the state’s broader attempt to restructure kin-based social organization in order to 
consolidate political authority.   
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On the other hand, the preservation of Islamic inheritance law was surprising because the state 
abolished Shari’a courts and secularized its legal system as a whole. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
extent to which the PSC is secular has been contested since its promulgation. While the code does not 
mention Islam by name, political leaders emphasized the continuing faithfulness of the law to Islamic 
heritage and presented the code as a new phase of Islamic legal interpretation. Notably, scholarship on 
Islamic family law also suggests that unlike other areas of the law, inheritance laws as articulated in the 
Qur’an are strict and precise and are therefore considered to be the most sacred and untouchable part 
of the Shari’a. Thus, it is arguable that the inconsistencies within Tunisia’s family law reforms reflected 
contestation between Islamist and secularist forces at independence that constrained the state’s ability to 
reform inheritance law.  
There is a broad literature on religion and the state in the Middle East. This section 
overviews theories of religion and state ideology in the Middle East that view the relationship 
between religion and the state, especially state ideology’s with respect to religion, as the critical 
variable shaping state policy on religion.  
Religion and the State  
 One perspective on the relationship between religion and the state is offered by the religious 
economy school, which draw on rational choice theory in economics to explain differences in state 
policy towards the religious establishment. In The Political Origins of Religious Liberty, for example, 
Anthony Gill argues that the degree to which a state regulates the “religious market,” or the public 
arena in which religious institutions compete for adherents, is determined by the political and economic 
interest of state leaders. Building on the assumption that political leaders are primarily concerned with 
their own survival and their ability to minimize social unrest, Gill argues that states are mostly likely to 
adopt policies restricting religious practice that serve this aim. In contrast, when political leaders 
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calculate that their interests would be better served by liberalizing regulations of religious practice, states 
are more likely to permit greater religious freedom.116  
The religious economy approach highlights the role of political interest in determining policy 
towards the religious establishment. As Sarah Feuer notes, however, interest-based arguments cannot 
explain why leaders reason as they do, nor can they explain how the interests of leaders influenced 
specific policies shaping the religious realm. The assumption of that states act in their self-interest does 
not explain why or how leaders’ preferences, and thus their political calculations and ensuing policies, 
change over time.117  
Ideology and the Religious Establishment  
 Another perspective on the relationship between religion and the state emphasizes the role that 
ideology plays in determining policy outcomes concerning religion. Malika Zeghal, for example, argues 
that the dual modern and Islamic character of the Personal Status Code in Tunisia was instrumentalized 
by the post-independence regime in order to cultivate legitimacy and control political opposition. In 
Varieties of Religious Establishment, Zeghal highlights how the relationship between Islam, the Shari’a, and 
the state in Tunisia were transformed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a way that 
generally undermined the role of the Shari’a in conceptions of secular law.118 Shari’a law was 
transformed under both the colonial and postcolonial state, she notes, from a revealed source that 
operated as a guiding principle for adjudication into an “implicit point of reference regulating the 
interaction of two specific domains—the state and the family—that state elites saw as tightly 
connected.”119  
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This shift in the use of Shar’ia as a guiding legal principle to the use of “implicit shar’ia” as a 
distant reference for the law, Zeghal suggests, reflected the emerging role of the modern state as a 
legislator. Wael Hallaq also suggests that the demise of Shari’a was brought about by the advent of the 
concept of nationalism in Muslim countries, primarily through the creation of the nation-state.120 The 
transformation in the role of the state, in Hallaq’s view, “is perhaps the most crucial fact about the so-
called legal reforms.”121 Whereas the traditional ruler was subject to the law and left judicial and 
legislative functions and authority to the religious scholars, the modern state reversed this principle and  
assumed the authority to determine the law. 
However, Zeghal emphasizes that although the 1956 Personal Status Code in itself did not 
invoke Shari’a, the official state narratives justifying the code insisted on its roots in Shari’a law as well 
as on its progressive and modernist aspects.122 For example, the preface of the code introduced in 1958 
suggested that the code aimed to make the law accessible and efficient while also insisting that the code 
was a specific interpretation of the Shari’a. The preface described secular law as more suitable than 
Shari’a law to promote Tunisia’s development and modernization, but also referenced Shari’a as a 
legislation “faithful to the needs of the human person whatever the times and the conditions,” a 
narrative which reflected religious authorities’ conception of Shari’a law.123 In this way, Shari’a was not 
entirely erased from narratives advanced about the code. State narratives insisted on both the modern 
dimension as well as the Islamic legacy of the code.124   
Zeghal argues that the post-independence regime thus instrumentalized ideology in order to 
both cultivate a modern national identity as well as to control political opposition.125 The insistence on 
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the religious genealogy of the PSC in state rhetoric reflected the state’s attempt to legitimize its political 
authority. Moreover, she argues, the state emphasized the law’s interpretive character to mitigate 
political opposition of conservative religious authorities; Islam and modernity were rhetorically 
combined in the state’s discursive justification of its political authority in order to appeal to both 
Islamist and secularist positions in Tunisian society. The state’s rhetorical insistence on the dual modern 
and Islamic character of the Personal Status Code reflected the state’s attempt to both cultivate modern 
Tunisian national identity as well as insulate its political power and legitimacy from religious opposition.  
Sarah Feuer offers a similar perspective on the relationship between religion and the state that 
views ideology as a critical variable shaping state policy towards the religious establishment, but 
importantly, calls attention to two other variables that interact with ideology to determine policy 
outcomes. In Religious Establishment and Religious Survival, Feuer develops an overarching theory to explain 
why and how states in the Middle East endorse, identify with, and support religion. Feuer’s central 
argument is that a regime’s ideology of legitimation—that is, the rhetorical justifications it offers for its 
right to rule—influence the nature of the religious establishment in authoritarian states. An 
authoritarian regime’s legitimating ideology, she suggests, influences state policy on the religious 
establishment insofar the regime’s discursive justifications for its right to rule establish a framework 
within which the regime can maneuver and delineates the range of policy options the regime can adopt 
without opposing its own stated ideological commitments.126 Despite the absence of normalized 
mechanisms of political turnover, authoritarian rules nonetheless know their regimes will be judge by 
how closely their policies adhere to their stated ideological preferences. Thus, to the extent that a 
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regime’s legitimating ideology includes identification with citizens’ religious identities, the regime will be 
either more or less compelled to support, identify with, and endorse religion in public.127  
Although Feuer focuses on the regime’s ideology as a critical variable shaping state policy 
towards the religious establishment, she argues that legitimating ideology alone cannot explain the 
nature of religious establishment or how the state’s relationship to religious establishment changes over 
time. For example, ideology alone as an explanatory factor cannot account for why Moroccan and 
Tunisian regulations of religious education over time given that both regimes’ ideologies remained 
constant throughout the period she examines. Rather, she suggests, two addition variables are needed to 
explain variation in state policy: the “landscape of the regime’s political opponents and allies” and the 
regime’s “institutional endowment.”  
Feuer extends Charrad’s focus on the role of a regime’s political supporters by also emphasizing 
the salience of a regime’s political opponents in determining policy outcomes.128 In addition, she 
highlights the strength of a regime’s “institutional endowment,” which she measures by the presence or 
absence of a hegemonic political party and the relative strength of bureaucracy, also determine the 
nature of policy outcomes.129 Institutional resources, she argues, can determine a regime’s ability to 
carry out policies in line with its ideology of legitimation. Moreover, the presence or absence of a 
dominant political party and strong bureaucracy can determine a regime’s response to political 
opposition. Thus, when confronting oppositional forces, a regime’s decision to coopt, repress, or ignore 
opposition depend on the institutional resources at its disposal. Strong institutional endowment 
facilitates the regime’s ability to oppress its opponents, while a weaker institutional endowment compels 
the regime to coopt them  
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The theoretical framework Feuer develops to analyze state policy on the religious establishment 
seeks to identify a logic that governs the strategic calculations authoritarian regimes make in 
implementing policies as part of their strategy for political survival. In this way, Feuer’s framework 
powerfully synthesizes both political, historical-institutional, and game-theoretic approaches to 
explaining policy outcomes in Middle Eastern states.  
Theoretical Implications of Religion-State Relations for Family Law Reform 
Gill, Zeghal, and Feuer offer important perspectives on the relationship between religion 
and the state in Middle Eastern societies. While the literature on religion and the state as a whole 
does not emphasize gender in its analysis of state policy, a framework focused on the 
relationship between religion and the state sharpens our understanding of the critical variables 
that shape family law policy in the Middle East. Rather than pointing to broad social-structural 
factors that shape the state’s interests, state ideology introduces greater theoretical precision into 
explanations of state policy by focusing on the specific political and institutional contexts in 
which political decision-making occurs.  
Building on this scholarship, to answer the research question of this thesis, I argue that 
the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia’s Personal Status Code reflects 
concessions made to the religious establishment’s demands concerning the nature of the code as 
part of the post-independence regime’s strategy for political survival. The theoretical framework 
I adopt to explain this policy outcome emphasizes the interaction between three critical factors: 
(i) state ideology (ii) political environment and (iii) institutional capacity. I suggest that the 
preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia’s family code reflects the interaction of these 
three factors.  
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 (i) The first claim of this thesis is that state ideology, or what I also refer to as a regime’s 
“legitimating ideology,” will influence the nature of family law reform. As discussed in Chapter 
One, a regime’s legitimating ideology is a set of overarching rhetorical justifications a regime 
offers for its political authority. I suggest that the degree to which a regime relies on religious 
themes or principles in its legitimating ideology will partly determine the nature of family law 
policy by delineating the kinds of policies the regime can adopt with respect to religion.  
(ii) The second claim of this thesis, however, is that ideology alone cannot explain the 
nature of family law policy. Ideology is important to explain policy outcome because it frames 
the policy choices available to a regime, but explanations relying on ideology alone cannot 
account for instances in which a regime’s policies contradict one another or the regime’s own 
legitimating ideology. Two other factors are needed to explain the preservation of Islamic 
inheritance law in Tunisia: the political environment of opponents confronting the regime and 
the regime’s institutional capacity.  
“Political environment” refers to the configuration of the groups a regime perceives to 
be its political opponents and allies. I suggest that the degree to which a regime’s political 
opponents frame their demands and base their own claim to legitimacy on religious grounds will 
influence the nature of family law policy. What is critical to determining policy outcomes is the 
degree to which opposition forces incorporation religious themes into their demands. Thus, 
confronting these demands, the regime must choose to either coopt the opposition by 
conceding to some of its preferences or to repress it.  
(iii) The third claim of this thesis, moreover, is that like a regime’s legitimating ideology, 
political opposition cannot fully explain the nature of family law policy. This is because in 
advancing its political agenda and determining how to minimize political opposition, regimes 
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confront another critical factor: the strength of their institutional capacity. I define “institutional 
capacity” as the relative strength or weakness of the political party structure, which I measure as 
ideological consensus among party leaders and members. I suggest that extent to which a ruling 
party has the capacity to carry out its political agenda determines whether the regime will coopt 
or suppress opposition forces; institutional capacity, as it interacts with political environment, 
thereby influences the nature of family law policy.  
 The theory assessed in the remainder of this thesis can thus be summarized as follows: 
while (i) the incorporation of religious themes into a regime’s legitimating ideology will play an 
important role in determining the kinds of polices it can adopt with regard to Islamic family law, 
policy outcomes will be critically shaped by (ii) whether the political opposition confronting the 
regime bases their own claim to legitimacy on religious grounds and (iii) whether the regime has 
the institutional capacity to implement its political agenda without coopting religious opposition 
forces. 
 In the following two chapters, I assess this argument by examining the rhetoric of the 
post-independence regime in Tunisia in the speeches and statements of the state elite as well as 
the secondary literature on the politics of the nationalist movement in Tunisia and the structure 
of the ruling party at independence. If my argument is correct, I should expect to find (i) the 
incorporation of religious themes into the legitimating ideology of the post-independence 
regime, (ii) political opposition forces challenging the political authority of the regime on 
religious grounds, and (iii) the cooption of political opposition due to ideological disunity among 
leaders and members of the ruling party.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the literature on gender and the state the Middle East to 
identify existing explanations of state policy on family law as well as highlight current gaps in the 
literature. Scholarship on gender and state building in the Middle East emphasizes state building 
strategy as shaped by the relationship between states and tribes as the critical variable shaping 
state policy on family law. Overall, state building perspectives highlight the influence of tribal 
politics on policy outcomes in Middle Eastern states. Scholarship on the gendered and 
patriarchal practices of Middle Eastern states, on the other hand, emphasizes the patriarchal 
interests of the state as the critical variable shaping state policy on family law. Perspectives 
focusing on gendered interests highlight the important social and economic implications of 
family law reform. Finally, scholarship on religion and the state emphasizes state ideology with 
regard to religion as the critical variable shaping state policy on family law. State ideology 
perspectives emphasize how the incorporation of religious themes into state ideology delineates 
the range of policy options available to the state in matters of religion. I suggest that this 
framework provides a key perspective on the research question of this thesis. The chapter 
concluded with a summary of the argument assessed in this thesis.  
In the remainder of this thesis, I assess the explanatory power of this argument. Chapter 
Four begins by examining the incorporation of religious themes into the legitimating ideology of 
Bourguiba’s regime. Chapter Five then examines the interaction of this variable with the political 
environment and the institutional capacity of the state at independence.  
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4 
DELINEATING POLICY OPTIONS: THE LEGITIMATING 
IDEOLOGY OF BOURGUIBA’S REGIME 
 
 
To assess the explanatory power of the argument proposed in this thesis, this chapter 
examines Bourguiba’s views on Islam and modernization and his strategic approach to achieving 
political goals to understand the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime. Chapter Five will 
demonstrate how the interaction of this variable with the political environment and the 
institutional capacity of the state at independence influenced the nature the Personal Status Code 
and thereby the outcome of inheritance reform. Here, I begin by establishing how the regime’s 
discursive justifications for its political authority created a framework within which the regime 
could maneuver and delineated the range of policy options it could adopt without opposing its 
own stated ideological commitments. 
The first section examines Bourguiba’s views on modernization and the role of Islam in 
modern state and society. It highlights the path of secular modernization pursued by Kemal 
Atatürk in Turkey to emphasize what was distinctive about Bourguiba’s vision for the role of 
Islam in Tunisia’s modernization. The second section examines the political ideology Bourguiba 
ascribed to as a nationalist leader. It considers how the distinctive politics of modernization 
Bourguiba confronted in Tunisia informed his strategic approach to implementing modernist 
reforms. The chapter concludes with a summary of the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s 
regime outlined in the preceding sections.  
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Bourguiba’s Views on Islam and Modernization 
 A central claim of this thesis is that the nature of policy reform in Tunisia was informed 
in part by the regime’s legitimating ideology, particularly the degree to which the regime’s 
discursive justification of its political authority incorporated religious themes. A clearer 
understanding of this factor is necessary to analyze how its interaction with political and 
institutional factors affected the nature of family law reform.   
Turkish Modernization: The Secularist Approach  
 Comparisons are often made between Bourguiba and Kemal Atatürk in terms of 
secularist ideology and political strategy. As a result, scholars also frequently suggest that 
Bourguiba drew inspiration for the Personal Status Code from Turkey’s secular reforms. It is 
therefore useful to examine the relationship between Islam and modernization in the Turkish 
context to sharpen our understanding of the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime and 
Bourguiba’s strategic approach to implementing modernist reforms.  
Turkey is a unique and particularly radical example of a secularized nation in the Middle 
East.130 Few leaders of Muslim countries have rejected their nation’s Islamic heritage as Atatürk 
did upon gaining Turkish independence. Turkey’s secular political model departed sharply from 
Islamic tradition and Arab and Middle Eastern convention and embraced the principle that 
modernization and development require Westernization and secularization. Atatürk attempted 
not only to separate political and religious authority in Turkey, but to abolish the influence of 
religious principles and values on almost every major aspect of Turkish society. Atatürk’s 
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reforms continue to challenge the identity of other nations throughout the Islamic world, where 
he is widely viewed as an extremist and uncompromising leader.131  
It is noteworthy that preceding the establishment of Atatürk’s secular regime, three 
major trends characterized Turkish nationalism: Islamism, Westernism, and Turkism. The 
Islamist trend was the most traditionalist. Its major representatives argued that the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire reflected of the neglect of the shari’a, which they viewed as the source of 
social justice and political stability in the Islamic community. They attacked the tanzimat, a 
nineteenth-century law granting political equality to all Ottoman subjects, on the grounds that it 
represented a western legal code contrary to the shari’a. In short, the Islamists sought to restore 
power and prestige to the Ottoman empire and build sound political institutions, not through 
the introduction of European models, but through adherence to orthodox Islamic principles.132   
The second trend of Turkish nationalism consisted of what sociologist Ziya Gökalp 
called “the zealots of Europeanism.” Its major representatives were the leaders of the earlier 
tanzimat reforms who advocated to imitate Western nations in economics, technology, and the 
sciences and sought to base Ottoman political institutions and laws on European models and 
codes. This group was closer to Atatürk’s secular ideology insofar as they viewed Western 
tradition as the means to promote Turkey’s development.133 
The third trend of Turkish nationalism consisted of the Turkists, a small group of 
Western-educated elite of which Atatürk was the major representative. Atatürk and his followers 
in the Republican People’s Party rejected Islam insofar as they associated it with Arab cultural 
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imperialism and Ottoman decline and corruption.134 They advocated for the integration of 
Turkey into Western civilization while retaining Turkey’s distinctive identity. The Turkists’ was 
to erase the cultural influence of the Islamic faith and Arab culture on Turkey—which was 
closely associated with the culture and institutions of the Ottoman Empire—and to restore 
Turkey to its pre-Islamic status.135 Headed by Atatürk , the Republican People’s Party 
prosecuted the war of Turkish independence and was well positioned after independence in 
terms of both power and prestige to model the modern Turkish state on Western institutions.  
Upon gaining independence in 1923, Atatürk pursued rapid and sweeping reforms of 
Turkey’s social, political, and economic life. Through his reforms, he sought to explicitly 
transform Turkey into a Westernized state and sever all ties to Arab and Muslim traditions 
embodied in the Ottoman Empire, which he viewed as outdated and as impediments Turkey’s 
development. Atatürk projected himself as a secularist and modernizing reformer.136  
It is useful to distinguish briefly between several types of modern secularism to 
understand what was distinctive about the path of secularization Turkey followed under 
Atatürk’s regime. Donald Eugene Smith has identified four types of secularism in the modern 
era.137 The first entails a clear separation of the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical 
structures. The second type, by contrast, consists of the “expansion of the polity to perform 
regulatory functions in the socioeconomic sphere which were formerly performed by religious 
structures.”138 The third type is a “'transvaluation' of the political culture to emphasize 
nontranscendent temporal goals and rational, pragmatic means,”139 or in other words, to 
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emphasize secular political goals and values. Lastly, the fourth type entails the abolition or 
radical alteration of the role religion in the state and society. 
The fourth type, which Kefi Handal describes as “radical secularization,” is the kind 
associated with the Atatürk’s reforms. Atatürk’s secularization sought to eliminate focal points 
of religious power, both political and social, and to radically transform the Turkish population’s 
value system. Among his reforms, Atatürk abolished of the Caliphate, eliminated the authority 
of the religious courts in civil matters, and dissolved the educational institutions of the ‘ulama. 
Dervish orders—religious orders associated with Sufi Islam—were outlawed and their 
monasteries shut down. With the introduction of the new Civil Code in 1926, all religious laws 
from the Ottoman Era—including family law—were discarded. New civil laws were based on 
the Swiss Code, the new penal code was based on the Italian mode, and commerce and property 
laws reflected the German model.140 In 1928, the state was officially declared secular, thereby 
eliminating the constitutional provision that had established Islam as the official state religion 
under Ottoman rule. 
Among Atatürk’s symbolic secular reforms, moreover, were the abandonment of the 
Arabic script and the introduction of the Western Gregorian Calendar. Men were also forbidden 
to wear the fez, and the wearing of the veil by women was outlawed. Sunday was designated as 
the day of rest instead of Friday, the Muslim holy day. In Turkey’s new capital at Ankara—
which replaced Istanbul, the old seat of the caliph—no new mosques were built into its newer 
sections. Notably, the Islamic call to prayer and reading of the Qur’an were required to be done 
in the Turkish language rather than in Arabic. 141  
                                                        
140 Ibid., 127.  
141 Ibid. 
 74 
 
In sum, Atatürk sought the total transformation of Turkey into a secular Westernized 
nation. He aimed not only to modernize Turkish state and society, but to modernize them 
through the radical departure from Arab and Islamic tradition and the adoption of Western 
institutions, customs, and values. Atatürk’s vision for Turkish modernization was thoroughly 
secular in both its rhetoric and policies.  
Tunisian Modernization: The Tunisian Personality 
There are clear parallels between Bourguiba and Atatürk as leaders of Western-oriented, 
European-educated nationalist parties who sought to alter the role of religion in modern Muslim 
society. Both leaders sought to construct new national identities following a long period of 
empire or colonialism, both were modernizers with autocratic personal and governing styles, and 
both developed legitimating ideologies that sought to supersede strong historical traditions and 
heritage.142 
It is critical to note, however, that while Bourguiba both studied and admired Atatürk’s 
reforms, Bourguiba and other Tunisian lawmakers explicitly distinguished their views on the role 
of Islam in modern society from the Turkish model. Bourguiba articulated a view of the 
relationship between Islam and modernization that was fundamentally distinct from the path of 
secularization followed in Turkey. The crucial difference between modernization in Tunisia and 
Turkey, both rhetorically and in terms of policy, was that Bourguiba did not seek to eliminate 
Islam from the public sphere entirely as Atatürk had done.   
In 1965, for example, Bourguiba stated:  
Ataturk’s very critical attitude towards his people’s religious heritage certainly 
explains why his action was received reservedly in Arab and Muslim countries 
where it did not invariably make a particularly deep impression. The founder of 
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modern Turkey regarded Islamic tradition as responsible for stagnation and an 
attitude of immobilism. In other words, as a brake rather than a lever.143  
 
Bourguiba, in contrast, rejected the view that Islam is an inherently negative or stagnant force. 
He did not view Islam itself as not the cause of its decline, but rather as the result of the 
overriding circumstances of colonialism: 
Our own opinion on this matter—in light of the Tunisian experience, and of all 
that we have learned from the evolution of Islam—differs appreciably from these 
excessively radical conclusions. When decisive and overriding circumstances—the 
colonial phenomenon, for instance—brought the natural flow of life, and the 
progress of the nations to a halt, discouragement set in and faith became rigid.144  
 
In contrast to Atatürk, Bourguiba considered the official rejection of Islam a political 
impossibility. Creating a secular state within the framework of the global Muslim community, he 
suggested, would alienate the state from its Arab neighbors:  
The creation of a nonreligious State on Muslim soil was unquestionably a 
disturbing novelty for most Muslims and it was from this point that a hiatus 
occurred between the Mashreq145 and the Maghreb countries.146  
 
Rather, Bourguiba viewed Islam as inseparable from the political foundations of the modern 
state and from the social and psychological identity of an Arab-Muslim population. He 
continued:  
We must not forget that for the Arab peoples, religion preceded the State. It gave 
laws before the State. And side by side with the State, religion should guide, 
inspire, and harmonize. We regard these two entities as complementary, not 
contradictory; we consider it better to unite them than to separate them.147  
 
Indeed, Bourguiba suggested that Atatürk followed an entirely Western-oriented path because 
he was not an Arab:  
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Research was done to attempt to determine the origin of the Turkish race. It has 
been pointed out that the Turks were of Indo-European origin and that they had 
nothing in common with the Semites, the ethnological group of the Arabs and 
the Jews. To clearly mark Turkey’s belonging to the European camp, family 
names were radically changed. Latin characters were substituted for the Arabic 
characters.148 
 
Bourguiba’s approach to religion and modernization is better described as a process of 
“desacrilization” than as secularization per se. While these terms are similar, they have essentially 
different meanings. Charles Gallager has described desacrilization as “the removal of traditional 
taboos from core areas of social behavior.”149 The 1956 Tunisian Constitution, to be sure, 
declares that Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its language. Atatürk eliminated both 
Islam and the Arabic language from the institutions of the state and institutionalized an entirely 
Western-oriented political system. Bourguiba, however, carefully differentiated his vision for 
Tunisia’s modernization from Turkey’s secularization: 
Atatürk passed for being crazy about modernism. His sources of inspiration were to be 
found essentially secular, Now, we all know that the Turks are Muslims and profoundly 
attached to their religion, their faith sometimes even bordering on fanaticism. Overnight, 
not even one religious institution existed any longer. He wanted to shape his country to 
the image of France. But he had forgotten that the Catholic religion was propagated and 
served in secular France by a whole ecclesiastical hierarchy headed up by the Pope. The 
secularization caused ravages in the ranks of the Muslims. They experienced such 
decadence that they returned to the practices of the whirling dervishes.150  
 
It is thus misleading to liken the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime to Atatürk’s insofar 
as Bourguiba did not seek separate religious and political authority. While both were modernists, 
Bourguiba, unlike Atatürk, was the ruler of an Islamic state. Bourguiba’s intent was never to 
build a secular state, but rather to endow the state with religious authority and extend state 
control over the religious realm.  
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 It is significant that a central component of Bourguiba’s rhetoric of legitimacy during the 
anti-colonial struggle was the definition “la personnalité tunisienne,” or the “Tunisian 
personality,” through Arab-Islamic symbolism. For Bourguiba, as Normal Salem suggests, the 
cultural superstructure that defined the political community and lent historical legitimacy to his 
regime was Tunisian, and Islam was a fundamental component of this superstructure. It was 
thus an Islamic Tunisian cultural superstructure that became the source of symbolism used to 
cultivate legitimacy and maintain political authority.151  
To be sure, the Tunisian cultural superstructure extended beyond Islam’s influence. 
Bourguiba insisted on the recognition of the pre-Islamic history of Tunisia to demonstrate the 
existence of a specifically Tunisian identity before the advent of Islam: 
It is certain first of all that people will feel a sense of pride in discovering that 
their history does not go back only twenty or thirty years, but well beyond. Of 
course, they know vaguely certain prestigious names such as Cartage or Kairouan. 
But we must also explain to them the reasons for our delay and for the centuries 
of decadence experienced by the country. We fight better against an evil when we 
know its origin.152 
 
In his speeches, Bourguiba often referred to the Punic culture that developed through the 
encounter of the Berbers with Phoenician settlers as a specifically Tunisian variant of Phoenician 
civilization.153 Nonetheless, Bourguiba identified Islam as a fundamental component of Tunisian 
identity: 
Throughout history, Tunisia has been conquered many times. Only once did it 
become totally integrated with its conquerors. That was when the Arabs occupied 
it, bringing with them a religion which gave all believers the same rights.154 
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In a public debate regarding the veil, moreover, Bourguiba articulated the Tunisian personality 
explicitly through Arab-Islamic symbolism:   
Let us put aside the various opinions on the [veil]. We well admit that [it] is part 
of the Tunisian personality although it is in no way aesthetic. In our present time, 
it is obvious that the colonial power is doing anything in its power to annihilate 
our personality by imposing French ways of life. We are not strong, we have no 
power, but we should do everything to preserve even some decadent symbols of 
our personality. This is the only way to preserve our entity. We will discuss this 
problem is no longer a threat to our national personality as was the case for the 
use of western clothes.155 
 
He suggested that the veil—as part of the distinctive social customs of Islam—was a symbol of 
the Tunisian personality: 
…I have posed in clear and precise terms the great social problem which has 
always been on the agenda of our discussions: is it in our interest to hasten, 
without sparing transitions, the disappearance of our habits, our customs, good 
or bad, and all these little things that together form, whatever we say, our 
personality? My response, given the exceptional circumstances in which we live, 
was categorical: No!156  
 
Indeed, this speech reflects Bourguiba’s political acumen, as he would call for the elimination of 
the veil after independence as a step towards the “liberation” of Tunisian women. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that Bourguiba identified Islam as a fundamental component of Tunisian identity. He 
continually articulated the goal of the nationalist struggle as “[saving] the country from 
assimilation…by affirming Tunisia’s Arabo-Muslim personality.”157   
The Instrumentalization of Islam  
This does not suggest that Bourguiba’s stance towards Islam necessarily arose out of his 
own convictions; there were also important political reasons for Bourguiba to embrace Islam. 
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During the nationalist struggle, as the previous quotation demonstrates, the Neo-Destour used 
Islam as an important anti-colonial political force. The nationalist movement presented Islam as 
a unifying feature that set the French and Tunisians apart. The symbols of Islam became the 
symbols of anti-colonial struggle and of Tunisia’s nationalist movement. In the pivotal decade of 
the 1940s to the beginning of the 1950s, the crescent of Islam gained symbolic focus and 
mosques became a rallying point for marginalized political parties as well as a hiding place for 
arms.158 Bourguiba publicly declared that the Neo-Destour and Islam were united in the 
nationalist struggle. “Certain men do not understand,” he stated in 1957, “that the Destour 
strives towards the Muslim religion.”159  
Although the alliance between Islam and the Neo-Destour developed during a political 
period that demanded unity between anti-colonial forces, this perception remained true during 
the formulation of policy towards Islam in the post-independence period. The pivotal role of 
Islam as a symbol of Neo-Destour legitimacy during the anti-colonial struggle endowed it with 
legitimating significance such that it could not be totally eliminated from the political institutions 
or culture of modern Tunisia. Islam had served as a unifying force among otherwise 
ideologically disparate forces during the anti-colonial struggle. Bourguiba thus did not have a 
monopoly over Islam’s symbolism at independence. Religious symbols had not been exclusively 
capitalized on by the Bourguibist faction of the Neo-Destour; they were also harnessed and 
manipulated by the conservative religious groups who rivaled Bourguiba’s political power.160 Ben 
Youssef in particular challenged Bourguiba in terms of this dimension of legitimacy. He 
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proposed the broad Arab-Islamic rather than the Tunisian “personality” as the basis for the 
historical legitimacy of the state, and consequently, favored a unitary Arab state rather than a 
Tunisian state.161 Bourguiba’s acceptance of Islam can thus be also interpreted as a strategic 
move to consolidate his political position in the post-independence period. In embracing 
Islam—at least ostensibly—Bourguiba removed religion as a political weapon to be harnessed 
by oppositional forces.  
It is important to emphasize Bourguiba’s flexibility concerning religion. Although he 
embraced Islam rhetorically, he did allow not it to bind him in political or juridical matters. For 
example, Bourguiba stated in 1960:  
The Progress of Islam and its development necessarily supposes an effort for 
constant reexamination and the free exercise of thought in order to make answer 
to all that which might appear as stagnant or as over done in legislation, to all that 
which does not respond anymore to the exigences of a life of renewal and which 
is no longer in harmony with the given objectives in long term changes.162  
 
Bourguiba continually maintained that there was a need for ijtihad to reinterpret the Qur’an and 
the Sunna according to the needs of changing social and economic conditions and modern 
society: 
It happened that in my previous speeches I insisted on the role of reason vis-à-vis 
religion and I showed the necessity of continues efforts of research and reflection 
in the spiritual and temporal domains, in order to give our life a constant impetus 
towards progress and prosperity and to preserve our religion from stagnation, 
which will make it powerless, and to answer the needs of our contemporary 
society and [meet] the demands of our time. Didn’t they rightly say that Islam is 
made for every time and every place?163 
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Moreover, he repeatedly emphasized that modernization required citizens to embrace 
interpretations of Islam that were more aligned with the demands of modern life: 
Among my functions and responsibilities as the Head of State, I am qualified to 
interpret the religious law... As the spiritual leader of Muslims in this country, I 
declare to you that each of you will accomplish an obligation as meritorious [as a 
religious one] if you donate the equivalent of the cost of one’s pilgrimage [to 
Mecca – one of five religious injunctions in Islam] to social welfare projects or 
when you invest in industrial businesses of your country, thereby refraining from 
soliciting foreign lenders.164 
 
Bourguiba also described the struggle for economic progress in Tunisia in terms of a jihad 
against underdevelopment. When Bourguiba advocated to break the fast during Ramadan, he 
referred to the Sunna to justify and legitimize his recommendation: 
Do you remember the Prophet’s proclamation to the Muslim army that was marching 
toward Mecca during the month of Ramadan: “I want you to carry out the victory,” he 
said, “when you arrive to Mecca, you must not be exhausted by fasting. Break the fast so 
that you will be able to achieve victory.165  
 
In this way, Bourguiba promoted flexible and reformist interpretations of religious doctrine. In 
his effort to extend of state control over the religious realm, he instrumentalized Islam’s reform 
to legitimize the regime’s ostensibly secular policies.  
Bourguiba’s invocation of Islam elicited mixed reactions in Tunisia. To many of 
Bourguiba’s supporters, the regime’s invocation of Islam represented a broader and virtuous 
goal of demonstrating that Islamic principles were suited to address modern issues. To his 
opponents, his approach to religion masked a desire to marginalize Tunisian’s traditional 
religious identities and practices. Regardless of his personal convictions about Islam, it is clear 
that Bourguiba sought to use religion as a tool of modernization and that this 
instrumentalization of Islam constituted a core component of the legitimating ideology of his 
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regime.166 While Bourguiba demonstrated considerable flexibility in his approach to religion, he 
nevertheless articulated religion as a constitutive element of the political authority of his regime  
His rhetorical justifications for the regime’s policies maneuvered within the framework of Islam. 
This ideology of legitimation both contrasted and overlapped in different measures with 
Bourguiba’s political opponents at independence.   
 
Bourguiba’s Political Ideology  
No discussion of the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime is complete without a 
discussion of Bourguibism. “Bourguibism,” while often described as a political ideology, is 
better characterized as a set of negotiation strategies to achieve political goals tailored to the 
particular variant of the politics of modernization Bourguiba confronted in Tunisia than as a 
coherent ideology that informed his political decision-making. A central claim of this thesis, as 
earlier stated, is that the nature of policy reform in Tunisia was informed not just by the regime’s 
ideology, but by the interaction of this variable with political and institutional factors. A clearer 
understanding of Bourguiba’s strategic approach to achieving his political goals is also necessary 
to appreciate how the legitimating ideology of the regime interacted with political and 
institutional factors to affect the nature of family law reform.   
Bourguibism as Negotiation Strategy  
Every political leader confronts problems of establishing modernity within the 
environment of their particular polity. Bourguiba was known for his distinctive problem-solving 
approach to the politics of modernization. Specifically, he was known for adopting a problem-
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solving approach tailored to the particular variation of the modernization politics he confronted 
in Tunisia.167  
While he never wrote a treatise on his political experience, Bourguiba’s political ideology 
has been articulated by many as a distinctive set of political ideas and methodologies. In contrast 
to Turkey, where Atatürk enshrined the six principles of Kemalism directly in his party’s 
platform, Bourguiba’s political ideology was more fluid and was not as clearly defined. This was 
due in large part to his focus on tactics over doctrine. “Bourguibisim,” as Michael Koplow 
explains, “began with a political orientation informed by the French Republican ideas of liberty, 
fraternity, and equality, and then pivoted toward applying Western norms and ideals to a 
homogenously Muslim country.”168 Bourguiba viewed the methods for doing so as more 
important than the actual ideals, since his focus was on the endpoint of modernization rather 
than particular path he followed to get there. He was therefore more willing to adopt a flexible 
stance at the expense of always enforcing a hardline doctrine.  
Bourguibism has elsewhere been described as the “the art of rational persuasion.”1 
Bourguiba was known as a leader who used his charisma to achieve carefully thought-out 
political and social objectives. Moore suggests a core principle of Bourguibism is the idea that 
change can never truly be forced, whether the goal is political independence or the 
modernization of Tunisian society. Rather, Bourguibism views rational persuasion as the means 
to effect political, social, and economic transformation. Indeed, Bourguiba denounced political 
extremism and doctrinal rigidity. Bourguiba once wrote of the Pan-Arabist movement in Tunis 
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and Cairo that “their Oriental mentality does not allow them to understand that politics is the art 
of attaining the possible.”1  
For the purposes here, Bourguibism can be taken as a style of political negotiation 
characterized by a combination of inflexibility in regard to principles with flexibility in the means 
used to implement them.169 Bourguibism ascribes to a set of principles, but maintains a 
distinction between principles or goals, which are nonnegotiable, and methods or means, which 
are. Bourguibist strategy is willing to advance in gradual stages and accepts compromises that 
lead towards a particular ultimate goal. Moore suggests that Bourguibism is effectively a 
rationalization for political opportunism.170 Bourguiba himself said of his negotiation strategy:  
In the Middle East, Bourguibism has been interpreted to mean one thing only, 
and even that is misunderstood: take what is offered and then ask for more. This 
is equivalent to saying that one should accept anything. As an illustration the 
example is given of a debtor who out of a debt of a hundred millimes agrees to 
pay back only one. That is better than anything, it is said, and the creditor has 
only to go on asking. No, that is not Bourguibism. In point of fact, Bourguibism 
only accepts a partial compromise insofar as it offers the possibility of taking everything owed.  
 
A better example could be taken from the art of strategy. Imagine you are in the 
position of someone who is trying to take a fortress held by an enemy who is 
stronger than you and from whom you cannot take everything at one blow. If he 
offers to let you have, say, a path which is useless, there is no point in accepting 
the compromise. But if he abandons a strategic position capable of becoming a 
point from which the whole system of fortifications can be taken, it would be 
criminal to refuse. So long as I feel myself incapable of taking the whole citadel 
by force, I would be failing in my duty and harming the cause of my country if I refused 
to take a point which would enable me later on to take all the rest.171 
 
 An appreciation of Bourguibism’s negotiation strategy is useful to analyzing how the 
interplay between the regime’s legitimating ideology and the political environment at 
independence affected the nature of family law reform insofar as it provides insight into 
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Bourguiba’s willingness to make concessions to his political opponents. As earlier discussed, 
despite its flexibility, the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime defined the state’s purpose 
and limited the range of policy options the regime could adopt without opposing its stated 
ideological commitments. Bourguiba’s vision for Tunisia’s modernization, to be sure, was to 
achieve parity with the West. Bourguiba articulated modernization and secularization as 
necessary to foster social and economic development in Tunisia and create a viable state. Indeed, 
Bourguiba’s emphasis on Tunisia’s pre-Islamic heritage can be viewed as an attempt to reorient 
Tunisian identity along nationalist lines distinct from an entirely Arab-Islamic narrative. Koplow 
goes as far as to suggest that “Every action by Bourguiba under the guise of the Tunisian state 
was evaluated based on these twin goals of modernization and secularization, and [actions] that 
conflicted with these aims were considered to be outside the sphere of acceptable political 
behavior.”172 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Bourguiba did not attempt to eradicate 
Islam from the public sphere entirely as Atatürk, for example, had done. Despite his goal to 
modernize Tunisia, Bourguiba understood that disregarding religion completely was politically 
impossible. He did not openly advocate secular reforms. Indeed, as Koplow notes, Bourguiba 
observed to his son after visiting Turkey that Ataturk “bit off more than he could chew in trying 
to do too much in too short of a time.”173 Rather, Bourguiba recognized Islam as a powerful 
force too deeply rooted in Tunisian society to be eliminated. For this reason, he undertook 
measures that would allow him to control and modernize Islam and extend state control over 
the religious realm. He discarded aspects of Islam he deemed as impediments to the 
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modernization and development and in doing so portrayed himself not as a secularist attempting 
to eradicate Islam, but as a Muslim reformer seeking to use religion as a positive force.  
 An appreciation of Bourguiba’s strategic approach to implementing modernist reforms, 
while it provides insight into Bourguiba’s willingness to make concessions to his opponents in 
the pursuit of his political goals, does not explain the circumstances under which he was willing 
to make concessions. Specifically, it does not explain why Bourguiba was willing to make a 
concession to his opponents in regard to inheritance law at independence. Understanding the 
interplay between the regime’s ideology and the political environment as well as the institutional 
capacity of the state at independence, to which the following chapter turns, provides this insight.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined Bourguiba’s stated views on Islam and modernization and his 
strategic approach to achieving political goals to understand the legitimating ideology of 
Bourguiba’s regime. It has demonstrated how the regime’s invocation of religious themes in 
discursive justifications for its political authority created a framework within which the regime 
could negotiate that was distinct from the ideology of secularism.  
Bourguiba articulated a view of the relationship between Islam and modernization that 
was fundamentally distinct from the path of secular modernization followed in Turkey. The 
regime’s discursive justification of its political authority incorporated explicit religious themes. 
While Bourguiba projected himself as a reformer, he projected himself as an Islamic, not a 
secularist reformer. Bourguiba’s rhetorical justifications for his modernizing reforms were 
grounded in the framework of Islam. Regardless of whether the incorporation of Islam into the 
legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime derived from personal conviction or political 
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necessity, it delineated the range of policy options the regime could adopt regarding religion 
without opposing its stated ideological commitment to preserving the Islamic identity of the 
state.   
In the following chapter, I demonstrate how the interplay of the legitimating ideology of 
Bourguiba’s regime with the political environment and the institutional capacity of the state at 
independence affected the nature of the Personal Status Code and thereby the outcome of 
inheritance reform.  
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5 
THE LIMITS OF REFORM: POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY  
 
Developing the argument laid out in Chapter Four, this chapter examines the political 
environment Bourguiba confronted at independence and the institutional capacity of 
Bourguiba’s regime to understand how the interaction of the regime’s legitimating ideology with 
these factors influenced the nature of the Personal Status Code and thereby the outcome of 
inheritance reform. The chapter argues that the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in 
Tunisia’s Personal Status Code reflects concessions made to the religious establishment’s 
demands concerning the nature of the code as part of the post-independence regime’s strategy 
for political survival. While (i) the constraints placed by the regime’s ideology on the kinds of 
policies it could adopt played a role in determining the nature of the code, policy outcome was 
significantly conditioned by (ii) the religious base of the political opposition confronting the 
regime and (iii) the relative weakness of the regime’s institutional capacity, specifically the 
existence of strong contestation over the ruling party’s authority that precluded the regime from 
unilaterally imposing a secular political agenda without risking backlash from religious 
opposition forces.  
I develop this argument by examining the political environment and the institutional 
capacity of the regime at independence. The first section examines the political environment of 
opponents Bourguiba confronted, highlighting the support of religious forces for Salah Ben 
Youssef, Bourguiba’s main political opponent. The second section examines the institutional 
capacity of Bourguiba’s regime, specifically the extent to which Bourguiba’s faction of the Neo-
Destour enjoyed hegemonic political authority. I emphasize the extent of Ben Youssef’s popular 
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support and the threat of internal dissent among Youssefist sympathizers within the Neo-
Destour.  
The chapter demonstrates that because the incorporation of religious themes into the 
regime’s discursive justification for its political authority required Bourguiba to gain at least 
rhetorical support for the Personal Status Code from religious authorities, contestation over 
Bourguiba’s authority from the Youssefist opposition compelled Bourguiba to coopt rather than 
outright suppress the religious establishment, thereby forcing Bourguiba to make concessions to 
some of the establishment’s demands in drafting the code—including the preservation of 
Islamic inheritance law—in order to gain their support.  
 
Political Environment of Opponents at Independence  
The second central claim of this thesis is that while ideology is important to explain 
policy outcomes because it frames the policy choices available to a regime, it cannot fully explain 
subsequent variation. Explanations relying on ideology alone cannot account for instances in 
which a regime’s policies contradict one another or the regime’s own governing ideology. The 
contradictions within the reforms strongly suggest that the preservation of Shari’a inheritance 
law was not merely the outcome of ideology. Two other factors are needed to explain the 
inconsistency of Tunisia’s family law reform: the political environment of opponents 
confronting the regime and the regime’s institutional capacity. This section analyzes the first 
claim in greater depth.  
The Political Environment: Religious Nationalists and Leftists  
As Chapter Two has discussed, following World War I, Tunisia’s emerging nationalist 
movement united two groups: The Destour party, founded in 1920 and representing a 
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traditional bourgeoisie of large merchant families and landowners, and the syndical movement 
under the leadership of Mohamed Ali el Hammi. In 1934, these two groups merged to form the 
broad-based Neo-Destour party. Within the Neo-Destour, a split emerged between a faction in 
support of Habib Bourguiba’s preference for a negotiated settlement with the French, and a 
faction in support of Salah Ben Youssef, the secretary general of the Neo-Destour and 
Bourguiba’s chief aid, who proposed a radical and potentially violent approach to defeating the 
French.174  
Even before independence, Bourguiba had always intended to maintain a strong 
relationship with the French, writing in a policy statement in 1950 that Tunisian military 
weakness and strategic strength necessitated “the assistance of a great power. To the extent that 
it will admit the legitimacy of our demands, we want that power to be France, and we are fully 
prepared to cooperate with it on a footing of equality between our two people.”175 Bourguiba 
was committed to a process in which Tunisia’s independence would be gained through 
negotiations with France and a relationship would be maintained once independence was 
achieved. Bourguiba neither sought to pursue armed confrontation with the French nor 
proposed that Tunisia should cut all ties from France and become part of a pan-Arab or North 
African state. Rather, Bourguiba sought to maintain a collaborative relationship with France and 
supported gradual advancement towards independence in order to maintain France as an ally.176 
Ben Youssef and his supporters, on the other hand, sought an entirely different path to 
independence. Ben Youssef’s faction of the Neo-Destour viewed the path to independence as a 
confrontational and potentially violent one and sought to partake in a larger pan-Arab 
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movement that would expel France out of North Africa.177 Later adopting the slogan “the rifle 
instead of the ballot box,”178 Youssefists supported a far more radical and revolutionary agenda 
than the Bourguibist faction. Ben Youssef wanted neither to maintain a relationship with France 
nor to placate the French through a gradual move towards independence. Rather, Ben Youssef 
considered independence to require armed revolt, and sought France’s immediate departure 
from France and the entirety of North Africa, whether of its own volition or through violent 
expulsion.179 
 The division within the Neo-Destour, however, did not only reflect differing opinions 
concerning the best way to achieve independence. The division also reflected major 
disagreements over the extent to which religion should be incorporated into the institutions of 
the independent polity.180 At the core of their public differences was a fundamental ideological 
split over the path that Tunisia should follow as an independent state. Bourguiba’s faction in the 
Neo-Destour were generally more secular, bilingual, “modernist” elites who had been educated 
at institutions such as the Sadiki School and supported Bourguiba’s emphasis on a “Tunisian 
personality” that transcended religious or ethnic identity. Ben Youssef’s support, in contrast, 
derived from a conservative faction within the Neo-Destour that included members of the 
Islamic establishment centered around the Zaytuna Mosque-University, rural tribesmen, and 
lower-class immigrants to the cities who were attracted to Ben Youssef’s pan-Islamic and pan-
Arab rhetoric.181 The impact of the Bourguibist-Youssefist divide on Bourguiba’s governance in 
the post-independence period is difficult to overstate. A brief overview of the political 
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significance of the Zaytuna is useful to appreciate the association between the Zaytuna and 
Bourguiba’s political opposition. 
 The Zaytuna mosque was built in 732 CE, followed five years later by the establishment 
of a madrasa, making it one of the oldest centers of Islamic learning in the world. From the eight 
to the eleventh centuries, the Zaytuna was a leading—if not the leading—university on the 
African continent, known for its advanced theological studies and its courses in scientific and 
literary subjects. From the thirteenth century onward, the institution experienced a decline, and 
it was only in the late nineteenth century that Tunisia’s political leaders sought to revive the 
school. In 1840, for example, the state restored the mosques ancient library. In 1875, structural 
and curricular reforms were introduced courses in history and mathematics.182  
 During the colonial period, in contrast to other parts of the Franco-Arabic colonial 
territory, France did not succeed in establishing state sponsorship of the Zaytuna during the 
Protectorate. As a result, the Zaytuna became a center of political resistance to colonial 
authorities, a resistance that was articulated in terms of a struggle to preserve Tunisia’s 
traditional Arab-Muslim heritage and identity. Moreover, once it became clear that they could 
not extend control over the Zaytuna, Protectorate authorities sought to prevent modernizing 
reforms to the intuitions that many of its students were demanding.  
 In their efforts to reform the institutions, Zaytunian students confronted conservative 
professors inimical to radical changes in the institutions structure and curricula. Disagreements 
between the old constituency of ‘ulama and the younger generation of reformist students and 
professors precluded major pedagogical reforms to the Zaytuna through the Second World War. 
Through continued student protest and staffing shortages, the institution gradually declined.    
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 After World War II, reformists at the Zaytuna were successfully in implementing certain 
changes to the structure and curricula of the institution. The appointment of Tahar Ben ‘Achour 
as rector of the university in 1945 was a critical juncture in this respect, as Ben ‘Achour was 
among the generation of Zaytunians who had advocated for modernizing reforms to the 
institution and became in a position to implement them. Nonetheless, Ben ‘Achour’s successes 
were undermined by an increasingly complicated and antagonist relationship between Zaytunian 
students and the nationalist movement. In 1949, for example, a “Committee of Zaytunian 
Students” presented the Protectorate government with a list of demands, among which was the 
creation of a University of Tunisia under the name of Zaytuna University that would house 
faculties of theology alongside departments of the humanities and sciences. While the 
Committee initially found support among activists within the nationalist movement, by 1950, 
divisions emerged between Zaytunians and certain leaders within the Neo-Destour.183 After 
Bourguiba orchestrated his expulsion from the party, Ben Youssef found support among 
Zaytunians in challenging Bourguiba’s position.  
The Zaytuna and the Early Reformist Movement  
 It is noteworthy that one of the earliest advocates of family law reform in Tunisia hailed 
from—and was ultimately suppressed by—the Zaytuna. The dominant problem that concerned 
Tunisians with respect to family law during the nationalist struggle form the 1930s to the 1950s 
was whether Islamic law should be modified or left unchanged. Although the issue of family law 
and women’s rights had first surfaced in Tunisia in the 1920s, it did not receive significant 
attention until the early 1930s.  
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 In 1930, Tahar Al Haddad, a progressive scholar at the Zaytuna, published a book titled 
Our Women in Law and Society.184 In the book, Al Haddad advocated for substantial reforms in 
laws governing the family and personal status. Arguing that Tunisian women were constantly 
debased, Al Haddad suggested that the purpose of his book was to argue for reform. Al Haddad 
called for changes in women’s status and improvements in women’s education as a way of 
making women better citizens, wives, and mothers. Among his views, Al Haddad opposed the 
veil and the seclusion of women, rejected polygamy and other forms of unchecked paternal 
power in families such as child and compulsory marriages, condemned unilateral repudiation, 
and urged the creation of divorce courts. Notably, he called for Muslim women’s rights to equal 
inheritance.185  
 Al Haddad was greatly influenced by the “discursive theological framework of the Hanafi 
school in which ‘ijtihad’ was based on arguments, justifications, rhetoric, and approbation.”186 In 
Our Women, Al Haddad claims that the Qur’anic and shari’a laws are not eternal, but rather are 
bound to a historical context. Because the essence of the Islamic faith is “justice” and “equality 
between people,” polygamy and gender inequality, like slavery, are to be gradually abolished. “In 
its essence,” Al Haddad writes, “Islam does not oppose the principle of equality in all its 
respects.”187 Al Haddad notes that during Muhammed’s life, new laws and texts came to cancel 
earlier ones. Because of historical progress, he suggests, divine law is not eternal, but rather must 
be compatible with modern times.188 
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Al Haddad was vehemently criticized for his views, ultimately costing him his career and 
reputation.189 The Zaytuna, as the center of religious education and scholarship in Tunisia and a 
bastion of conservatism and tradition, condemned the book immediately as an shocking attack 
against Islam.190 A commission was created at the Zaytuna tasked with evaluating the book, and 
ultimately reported that the book was blasphemous and supported the transgression of Islamic 
law and should therefore be banned. In compliance with the Zaytuna’s recommendation, the 
prime minister at the time placed a ban on the book and ultimately dismissed Al Haddad from 
his position. Moreover, the shayks of the Zaytuna accused Al Haddad of heresy and issued a 
fatwa revoking his Zaytuna degree, his notary license, and barring him from an exam room.191 
Following the backlash against the book, Al Haddad was viewed as a traitor and excluded from 
public life.  
It is also important to note that in addition to the colonial context, there was a 
generational and class conflict between Al Haddad and his opponents. The Zaytuna was led by 
the powerful and conservative old bourgeoisie of Tunis—including Tahar Ben Achour, whose 
endorsement of the code Bourguiba would seek at independence—who were working in concert 
with the French colonial authorities. The reformist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, on the 
other hand, was led by scholars of humbler origins. Al Haddad’s harshest critics attacked Al 
Haddad on his evolutionary conception of the Qur’an and for threatening male privileges 
deriving from the Islamic laws of inheritance and the habus system.192  
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Lamia Ben Youssef Zayzafoon has argued that the fatwa against Al Haddad was 
provoked less by his call for unveiling and educating “the Tunisian woman” than by his call for 
gender equality in inheritance, which, in his dialogic reading of the Qur’an, is not inimical to the 
“true” and egalitarian spirit of Islam. Al Haddad was the only Tunisian reformer who called for 
gender equality in inheritance.193 Many Tunisian reformers before Al Haddad had called for the 
education and unveiling of Tunisian women, but none were persecuted to the extent that Al 
Haddad was. This suggests, according to Zayzafoon, that the underlying cause for the fatwa 
against him was his call for gender equality in inheritance. In high school textbooks, for 
example, only Al Haddad’s call to give Tunisian women a domestic education that would 
adequately prepare her to fulfill her future role as mother and wife is mentioned. His call for 
gender equality in inheritance—a call more subversive of the shari’a—has been suppressed 
within Tunisian academia.194 In this way, she suggests, women’s rights came to embody the split 
between modernity and tradition in postcolonial Tunisia. While unveiling, work, and education 
were synonymous with inevitable social process, the shari’a laws came to represent an 
unchanging Tunisian essence that had to be protected from encroachment of Western culture.  
In sum, the political environment of opponents Bourguiba confronted at independence 
was defined by the division between Bourguiba’s and Ben Youssef’s factions within the Neo-
Destour. This division reflected not only differing opinions concerning the best way to achieve 
independence, but also major disagreements over the extent to which religion should be 
incorporated into the institutions of the independent polity. Insofar as Ben Youssef promoted 
the incorporation of Islam into the independent state, Ben Youssef drew support from religious 
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forces in Tunisian society, especially from religious authorities at the Zaytuna Mosque 
University. Among their conservative leanings, religious authorities at the Zaytuna were hostile 
to the reformist movement of the 1920s and 1930s advocating for substantial reforms to Islamic 
personal status law. Importantly, Bourguiba’s regime would consult Zaytuna authorities in 
drafting the Personal Status Code and seek their public support for the reforms.   
 
Institutional Capacity at Independence  
 The third central claim of this thesis is that like a regime’s legitimating ideology, political 
opposition cannot fully explain the observed variation in the liberalization of the Personal Status 
Code. This is because in advancing its political agenda and determining how to minimize 
political opposition, regimes confront another critical factor: the strength of their institutional 
capacity. This section analyzes the regime’s institutional capacity, which I measure as the 
ideological consensus among party leaders and members. My analysis challenges dominant 
assumptions that Bourguiba’s faction of the Neo-Destour enjoyed hegemonic political authority 
at independence and could therefore outright suppress the religious establishment.  
The Impact of Internal Opposition  
 Widespread religious discontent was too disorganized at independence to threaten 
Bourguiba’s position.195 As the previous section discussed, the institutional cohesion of the 
Zaytuna had declined under colonial rule to the point that the institution was too weak to 
directly challenge Bourguiba’s faction. What is often overlooked, however, is that Bourguiba was 
challenged on more immediate political grounds within his own party. Even before 
independence, the cohesion of the nationalist movement threatened to collapse under the 
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divisive impact of Youssefist opposition. An appreciation of Ben Youssef’s support is central to 
understanding the regime’s institutional capacity at independence because it demonstrates the 
fragility of Bourguiba’s appeal. Ben Youssef’s broad support reveals that stable political 
consensus had not yet been achieved in Tunisia, and thus, that the dissolution of religious 
opposition forces was not predetermined.  
 The ideological polarization between the Bourguibist and Youssefist factions of the 
nationalist movement escalated violently on the eve of independence. In April 1955, while Ben 
Youssef was still in exile abroad, France and the Neo-Destour reached an agreement on 
Tunisia’s internal autonomy in which France maintained control over Tunisian foreign and 
defense policy but acknowledge that it no longer had the power to rule the country, paving the 
way for the Neo-Destour to develop a government.196 The agreement also allowed French 
settlers to retain their property and court system while losing their political rights, granted the 
French language privileged status, and established close economic ties between France and 
Tunisia. Bourguiba backed the agreement and argued that it represented an important step 
toward full Tunisian independence.197 Ben Youssef, however, was strongly opposed an 
agreement that would maintain a close relationship with the former colonial power in Tunisia, 
moreover an agreement that granted the French authority over Tunisia’s foreign relations. Ben 
Youssef was committed to the position that Tunisian independence should be part of broad-
based approach linked to independence for Morocco and Algeria and that a pan-Maghrebi 
armed revolt was the most efficient path to achieving an independent state.198 
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 When Ben Youssef returned to Tunisia in September 1955, he was received with 
significant popular enthusiasm.199 Several weeks later in early October, once he determined he 
had sufficient support to attempt to challenge Bourguiba, Ben Youssef declared his opposition 
to the internal autonomy accords and publicly challenged Bourguiba’s legitimacy as the leader of 
the nationalist movement.200 In a Friday sermon at the Zaytuna Mosque on October 7th, Ben 
Youssef stated that the accords were a step backwards from Tunisian independence as they 
implicitly incorporated Tunisia as part of the French Union and that the accords abrogated the 
historical and legal legitimacy of the nationalist movement by fundamentally contradicting its 
Arab and Islamic character.201 Ben Youssef’s choice of venue for the sermon, as an article in Le 
Matin noted, was an important strategic move:   
To make his political return, Ben Youssef could not have made a better choice: a 
large attendance and above all a day and place that would help him place himself 
not only in favor of total independence but also in fervent defense of religion. 
Salah Ben Youssef, in criticizing the protocols, this time presents himself as the 
defender of Arabism and of Islam against the secularism advocated by the Neo-
Destour.202  
 
By delivering his speech at the Zaytuna, which was both an important religious and nationalist 
symbol, Ben Youssef ensured that his critique of the nationalist movement would be widely 
disseminated.203 At this point, Ben Youssef’s opposition to Bourguiba was no longer an 
interpersonal rivalry; it became a public challenge to the legitimacy of the Bourguibist faction as 
the leaders of the nationalist movement. Ben Youssef posed a serious threat not just because of 
his opposition to the internal autonomy accords. More importantly, Ben Youssef threatened the 
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authority of the Bourguibist faction because he presented his opposition to the accords in terms 
of a strategically different conceptions of the Tunisian state and the basis of its political 
authority. Ben Youssef’s opposition represented the struggle between different societal 
coalitions mobilizing behind antagonistic conceptions of the legitimacy of the Tunisian state.   
 Bourguiba responded immediately by orchestrating the expulsion of Ben Youssef from 
the Neo-Destour. On October 8th, Bourguiba called for a meeting of the Bureau Politique to 
remove Ben Youssef as the party’s secretary general and expelled him from the party the 
following day. Moreover, Bourguiba called for an extraordinary Party Congress on November 
15th in Sfax to reaffirm support for the internal autonomy accords.  
The conflict between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef reflected multiple dimensions of 
political struggle. As Norma Salem suggests, it represented both competition for effective 
leadership of the Neo-Destour, conflict between different societal coalitions, and conflict 
between different international alignments. At stake in the conflict between Bourguibist and 
Youssefist factions was the power to shape the direction of the independent polity.204   
Notably, although Bourguiba called for the Congress on October 8th, the decision was 
not publicized for several days in order to attempt to mitigate Bourguiba’s position, indicating 
that Ben Youssef had not lost all political support in the Party.205 Moreover, while Ben Youssef 
had not been invited to the Congress, a closed door session of Congress decided to invite him at 
the last minute, again indicating that Ben Youssef continued to enjoy at least some support from 
Party members.206 It is should be emphasized that although Ben Youssef was politically isolated 
at the top of the Neo-Destour hierarchy, many militants who had worked with Ben Youssef in 
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the past did not support his exclusion from the party. Ben Youssef had controlled the Party 
during Bourguiba’s absence from 1945-1949 and had positioned many of his own followers 
throughout the party structure.207 Interestingly, during the three months between June and 
September when Ben Youssef had not yet returned to Tunisia, Bourguiba’s speeches were free 
of any Islamic themes or references.208 On the day the internal autonomy accords were signed 
and several days after Ben Youssef’s return to Tunisia, however, Bourguiba gave a speech in 
Sfax calling for national unity which he ended with a quote from the Qur’an (3:103):  
And hold fast, 
All together, by the Rope 
Which God (stretches out 
For you), and be not divided  
Among yourselves.  
 
Ben Youssef declined the invitation, but the Congress convened nonetheless, officially 
reaffirming that the accords were a positive step towards independence and instating Bourguiba 
as the president of the Neo-Destour. In his opening speech, Bourguiba insisted on the Arab and 
Islamic dimensions of the Tunisian “personality,” although he argued that by its geography and 
as part of the Maghreb, Tunisia was Western. While the Congress was in session in Sfax, Ben 
Youssef held a rally in Tunis drawing 20,000 people, where he again attacked the accords and 
called for Tunisia to affirm its Arab and Islamic character:  
Tunisia…is an indivisible part of the Arab world…she is part of the Arab 
collectivity, nothing should separate her from it, contrary to what Bourguiba 
says…we cannot have any other destiny than an Arab destiny.209 
 
Following the Party Congress, the struggle between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef shifted 
to rural areas in southwest Tunisia. In late October 1955, Youssefist supporters began carrying 
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out guerilla attacks against Neo-Destour offices and proliferating through the southwest of the 
country, threatening to bring Tunisia to the brink of civil war. In January 1956, police raided Ben 
Youssef’s home and arrested over seventy Youssefists.210 Ben Youssef, who had been informed 
of the imminent raid, had already fled to Cairo.  
The Congress of October 1955 marked a turning in the struggle for power between 
Bourguibist and Youssefist factions. With the assistance of French military forces, Bourguiba 
was ultimately able to suppress Ben Youssef’s militias in the southern region of the country and 
moved forward in his negotiations with France, achieving full Tunisian independence in March 
1956. Nevertheless, in his attempt to consolidate the hegemony of his political party after 
independence, it is clear that Bourguiba continued to view Youssefists as a significant threat to 
the regime. Following the January 1956 arrests of Youssefist supporters, for example, the regime 
instituted a special criminal court to try them because Bourguiba suspected that the national 
judicial system contained Youssefist supporters.211 Moreover, although Ben Youssef had fled to 
Cairo after independence and was killed in 1961, when a plot to assassinate Bourguiba was 
uncovered in 1962, the regime accused the plotters of being Youssefist loyalists, executing or 
imprisoning the accused.212 After a series of protests broke out in 1962 among student groups 
opposing the regime, L’Action—the mouthpiece of the regime—claimed that “Youssefists” had 
helped to instigate the opposition.213  
In sum, upon closer examination, it is clear that the institutional capacity of Bourguiba’s 
regime was precariously weak at independence. The struggle between Bourguiba and Ben 
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Youssef demonstrates that Bourguiba’s authority was not definitively consolidated. Stable 
political consensus had not yet been achieved; Ben Youssef remained a popular figure and had a 
sizable faction of supporters both in society and within the Neo-Destour. The extent of Ben 
Youssef’s support reveals not only the fragility of Bourguiba’s authority, but also the power of 
ideological appeals to religion and pan-Arabism, both of which posed a threat to the legitimacy 
of the regime.214 Although Bourguiba had solidified his control over Neo-Destour institutions, it 
was not clear that he enjoyed the same level of support among the party’s constituents. The 
strength of the Youssefist threat to Bourguiba’s authority would compel Bourguiba to coopt 
rather than outright suppress the religious establishment, ultimately forcing Bourguiba to make 
concessions to some of the establishment’s demands in drafting the Personal Status Code in 
order to gain their support.  
 
Negotiating the Personal Status Code  
As the previous section demonstrated, while it is often taken for granted that 
Bourguiba’s faction of the Neo-Destour enjoyed the hegemonic political authority and robust 
institutional capacity to impose its political agenda at independence, Bourguiba in fact 
confronted a strong Youssefist opposition contesting the legitimacy of his regime. The 
Youssefist opposition had a strong religious base, drawing support from the socially influential if 
politically weak Zaytuna.  
This section demonstrates how the regime’s ideology, the political environment of 
opponents, and the institutional capacity of the regime interacted to influence the nature of the 
Personal Status Code and thereby the outcome of inheritance reform. It shows how, because the 
                                                        
214 Moore, Tunisia Since Independence, 246.  
 104 
 
incorporation of religious themes into the regime’s discursive justification for its political 
authority required Bourguiba to gain at least rhetorical support for the Personal Status Code 
from religious authorities, the threat of the Youssefist opposition at independence compelled 
Bourguiba to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious establishment, thereby forcing 
Bourguiba to make concessions to some of the establishment’s demands in drafting the code—
including the preservation of shari’a inheritance law—in order to gain their support. 
Laying the Groundwork for Reform  
Bourguiba did not attempt to unilaterally impose a new Personal Status Code. It is clear 
that in the months leading up to the promulgation of the code, Bourguiba strategically prepared 
the ground for his reforms to minimize opposition from religious forces. Bourguiba courted the 
religious authorities at the Zaytuna, even consulting Zaytuna authorities in drafting the code’s 
text, to secure their endorsement of the code. Overall, the strategy Bourguiba pursued—
exemplary of Bourguibist methodology—was to reform rather than to attack Islam, and to 
pursue changes incrementally rather than risk divisive backlash over the most controversial 
reforms while the regime’s political authority was still unconsolidated. 
In late April of 1956, in a move which had apparently been contemplated for months, 
Tahar Ben Achour was then appointed rector of Zaytuna University.215 Although he had 
previously clashed with the nationalist movement, particularly when he issued a fatwa in 1933 
concerning the naturalization of Muslims as French citizens, he was an important Maliki shayk 
from a distinguished family of religious scholars and had previously supported moderate 
reforms. Less conservative than many older shayks, Ben Achour was persuaded to support 
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Bourguiba’s reforms.216 At the same time, Bourguiba removed potential opposition in the 
Ministry of Justice by reshuffling the sheiks who sat on the shari’a courts.217  Almost all intended 
to sign a petition against the new Personal Status Code, but several were willing to accept 
positions as judges to apply the code when the religious courts were integrated into the state 
court in August. Through these steps, Bourguiba was able to obtain partial support for his 
controversial reforms from the influential circle of ‘ulama.  
Bourguiba also persuaded the Maliki Shayk El Islam Mohammed el Aziz Djait, who was 
consulted by the Ministry of Justice in 1956 in preparing the new Code, to accept the principle 
of the reform.218 The Shayk was reported by L’Action on September 3rd, 1956 to have said that 
“As long as one conserves one’s faith, religion can adapt; the main thing is to respect the spirit 
of Islam.”219 El Aziz Djait had previously demonstrated openness to reform while preserving the 
spirit of Islam, dispensing Tunisian workers from religious fasting, for example, while they were 
working in France during the First World War. Moreover, one of El Aziz Djait’s relatives, 
Abdelaziz Djait, was also appointed to the honorific position of Grand Mufti. Abdelaziz Djait 
had previously been the rector of the Zaytuna as well as a Shayk El Islam, and the move 
endowed the government an air of religious legitimacy.220 
 Importantly, while previously serving as the Minister of Justice and Shayk al Islam, 
Abdelaziz Djait had begun to codify family law in the 1940s in order to integrate it into a single 
text both at the request of the French colonial authorities and at his own behest, as many ‘ulama 
desired to standardize the law. For the jurists who had previously sought to reform the legal 
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system, the issue was not the shari’a itself, but rather the ad hoc process that characterized shari’a 
courts which they viewed as corrupt and unjust. This corruption was not the result of the 
substance of the shari’a, they explained, but rather of the procedures through which it was 
implemented. Djait thus sought to be integrate the law into a single text to be accessible to both 
judges and litigants.221  
The ‘Djait Code’ was drafted by a large committee of ‘ulama, lawyers, journalists, and 
intellectuals working under the patronage of the Ministry of Justice. The code addressed both 
land ownership and personal status issues and incorporated the provisions of the Maliki and 
Hanafi schools of law in these two domains. It should be emphasized that the Djait Code did 
not reform the shari’a; the substance of the shari’a remained unchanged. Rather, it simply 
integrated the law to facilitate its use in the courts. The text was organized into two columns, 
one for the Hanafi interoperation and the other for the Maliki school of law, leaving blank 
spaces where one school presented specific provisions on one issue the other school did not 
address. From this foundation, judges were to use their own judgements and could choose from 
either one or both of the columns, since these were not to be read as “competing” 
interpretations but rather as two collections of possible references that could be combined. 
Importantly, while the Djait Code was never applied under the Protectorate, it served as a 
template for the new personal status law drafted by the independent state in 1956.222  
 The Personal Status Code was promulgated on August 13th, 1956 and began to be 
applied in January 1957. While the Constituent Assembly, which also operated as a legislative 
body, had begun to convene in April 1956, the text of the code was neither discussed nor 
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presented to be voted upon by members of the Assembly. Rather, it was imposed by Bourguiba 
and his closest aides outside of the deliberative arena of the Assembly.  
The code was strongly opposed by the press at the time. In particular, the newspaper al-
Istiqlal disseminated the strong disapproval of many conservative ‘ulama from the Zaytuna.223 
Interestingly, in response to a request for a fatwa on the new Code, Djait published his opinion 
in September 1956 in al-Istiqlal. Cautiously critical of Bourguiba’s government, Djait wrote:  
I say to those who requested a fatwa that it was not lawful for the sincere believe 
to cause discord, which spread dissension, provides hatred and resentment and 
destroys the nation’s unity. However, if the objective is to know the truth and the 
divine law, in order to request form the popular government the revision of the 
article contradicting the sharia’s regulation and if the request is made in a way to 
avoid providing disorder and trouble, then I want to reassure the authors of the 
request that I have done my duty and wrote to the Ministry of Justice to ask for 
modification of articles 14-18-19-21-30-35-88.224 
 
The provisions of these seven articles out of the 170 of the code were unacceptable to most 
‘ulama at the time except for a few who agreed to officially support the project on behalf of the 
state.225 These articles—which criminalized polygamy, prohibited divorce by repudiation, and 
mandated divorce to take place before the court—represented a significant departure from 
Islamic law. It should be emphasized again, however, that the on the whole, the code was based 
on the Djait Code. The articles pertaining to inheritance, dowry, and descent respected shari’a 
law.226  
 Although the regime had the upper hand in negotiating the text of the code, a 
compromise was reached with the ‘ulama to secure their support. At the time, discussions in the 
Constituent Assembly were leading towards the recognition of Islam as the religion of the state. 
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Bourguiba thus agreed to endorse Islam as the religion of the state through Article 1 of the 
Constitution, which largely satisfied the ‘ulama. In exchange, the ulama had to accept certain 
violations of Islamic law in the new Personal Status Code.227 Ben Achour, as the rector of the 
Zaytuna, ultimately gave his approval of the code: “We give our full confidence to a government 
that has declared itself a Muslim government in its first fundamental law, to proclaim laws that 
are accepted by the elite and the whole community.”228  
The compromise, to be sure, was an unequal one. The contentious articles of the code 
were never modified towards a more ‘Islamic’ interpretation as Djait had advocated. The first 
article of the Constitution served as a symbolic compensation for religious opposition forces 
who wanted Islam to remain a prominent marker of Tunisian identity. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that Bourguiba neither outright repressed the religious establishment at independence nor 
disregarded the opinions of religious authorities in drafting the code. Rather, insofar as 
Bourguiba sought the Shayk’s public endorsement of the code, he negotiated the text of the 
code with the establishment and kept certain provisions of the shari’a intact.  
The Persistent Threat of Religious Opposition  
 The timing of other of Bourguiba’s controversial reforms supports the claim that the 
outright repression the religious establishment was a political impossibility at independence 
given the regime’s relatively weak institutional capacity and that Bourguiba postponed a head on 
clash with the Zaytuna until his regime had consolidated political authority and neutralized 
potential centers of Youssefist opposition. It is significant that Bourguiba waited until 1958 
before attempting one of the most difficult of his early reforms that directly attacked the 
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Zaytuna—that of the reforming the education system, which lay at the core of his 
modernization strategy. In 1958, he stated of his proposed reform: 
When we were in opposition, living outside legal institutions and harassing the 
Protectorate regime to obtain recognition of our rights, I told myself that if the 
state apparatus passes into our hands, we would give priority to the problem of 
education. This indeed concerns the motor element, the brain which permits man 
to rise above the animal condition…[With] useful knowledge the human being is 
capable of miracles; but if the content [of education] is retrograde, the whole 
society falls back to the level of the herd.229 
 
The reform, which took effect in October 1958, constituted an outright attack on the Zaytuna as 
an institution of conservative learning. Bourguiba sought to establish a coherent and unified 
system and significantly expand education.230 The integration of the Zaytuna into the state 
education system, to be sure, entailed the suppression of old opposition forces to Bourguiba’s 
regime. In the years before independence, no Tunisian would openly counter the Zaytuna 
because of the backing and prestige of Islam. Having consolidated the regime’s political 
authority, however, Bourguiba was better positioned to outright attack the religious 
establishment. Outlining his reform, Bourguiba said of the Zaytuna:  
[It] had the merit of opposing the current of Frenchification. This was not 
progress…only resistance…But today this is no longer sufficient. We have to be 
demanding. We have to advance and no longer be content with fixed positions. 
We are now free to adapt our education so as to catch up in the procession of 
civilization.231  
 
It is important to appreciate that the dissolution of the Zaytuna was a risk, as a Party 
member who had been charged with educational reforms suggested in 1961, because the 
university’s 16,000 students and 500 professors could revive political opposition to Bourguiba.232 
                                                        
229 Speech of Bourguiba, June 25, 1958. In Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government. 
230 Moore, 53.  
231 Speech of Bourguiba, June 25, 1958. Cited Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government 
232 Interview, December 2, 1961. In Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government.  
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Most had no prospects for employment in the state’s new unified system, as religious instruction 
had been cut to one to two hours a week in primary school and virtually eliminated in secondary 
education. While slightly more emphasis was accorded to religious instruction in the mid-1960s, 
the Zaytuna system of education was entirely eliminated. The remainder of the faculty of 
theology were integrated into the modern University of Tunis.233 The Party member’s comment 
suggests that the outright suppression of the Zaytuna was not a political possibility for 
Bourguiba at independence. Although the political influence of the Zaytuna had deteriorated by 
independence, the Zaytuna was nonetheless institutionally robust in 1956 and constituted a 
potential center of Youssefist opposition to Bourguiba’s regime that, given the size of its student 
and faculty body, could not be immediately dismantled.  
 The timing of Bourguiba’s attack on the strongest pillar of Islam—the custom of fasting 
during the month of Ramadan—also suggests that he postponed certain controversial reforms 
until the regime had consolidated political authority. His remarks on the proposed reform also 
reveal the enduring fear of the revival of Youssefist opposition. Although fasting was a custom 
adhered to even by almost all Tunisians, even those who had been exposed to Western 
traditions, Bourguiba attacked it on the grounds that it unnecessarily hindered economic and 
administrative activity. In February 1960, Bourguiba presented his campaign against fasting 
before political cadres:  
I do not believe that religion should be able to impose such a sacrifice…This is 
an abusive interpretation of the religion. When fasting, man’s physical forces are 
so depleted he is obliged to cease all activity. No dogma is justification for such a 
rhythm…All practices of this religion are issues of logical intentions. But when 
they become incompatible with the necessary struggles of this life, this religion 
must be amended.234 
 
                                                        
233 Ibid.  
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Bourguiba also suggested that he consulted both Abdelaziz Djait and Ben Achour before 
proposing the reform: 
I am not asking the people to give up the fast…But I am saying that if the fast 
risks endangering your health or interrupts the activity which is your means of 
living…then El Aziz Djait is there to give you the authorization to break this fast, 
which you will execute later when you are on vacation or retired.235  
 
It is noteworthy that Bourguiba continues to maneuver within the framework of Islam in 
proposing the reform. Although his speech is virulently opposed to fasting, Bourguiba 
nonetheless frames the proposal as a reform of rather than an attack on religion and invokes the 
support of religious authorities.  
Although Djait ultimately issue a fatwa at Bourguiba’s request, it did not align with 
Bourguiba’s expectations. Djait’s fatwa maintained that fasting was a religious duty, exemption 
from which could be attained only in cases of illness or military jihad. He supported Bourguiba’s 
proposal to close nightclubs during Ramadan, declaring that this was the real reason why people 
were tired during Ramadan, but did not dispense Tunisians from fasting. Djait and Ben Achour 
were both dismissed shortly after, and in late February, Bourguiba presented his own 
interpretation of the Qur’an in another appeal to the public: 
As Head of a Muslim state, I also may speak in the name of religion…If I asked 
advice from these professors [Djait and Ben Achour], it is because our action 
must benefit from unanimous agreement…Unfortunately our professors belong 
to a certain category of people who refuse to reason and judge according to past 
experience and the teachings of the Qur’an.”236 Bourguiba concluded the speech 
saying: “In so far as the young prove to be incapable of coping with the effort of 
work and fasting, we must be tolerant. They can break their fast with a quiet 
conscience. This is my [fatwa].237 
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Bourguiba modified the working hours of the administration, but faced widespread opposition 
among religious authorities, members of his own party, and some of his own ministers.238 
Addressing another meeting on Ramadan in the town of Sousse, where most party militants 
were religious conservatives, Bourguiba described his opponents as being “those slightly hit by 
the regime—revoked qaids, retired teachers, dishonest civil servants, clients of the Haute Cour 
who have lost their lands or jobs. All this attractive crowd claim to constitute the last stronghold 
for the defense of religion. Their real motive, however is quite clear.”239 Interestingly, in 1961, 
Bourguiba admitted that “many of my friends have advised me against bringing up the subject, 
for fear of upsetting public opinion,” and that while “the overwhelming majority of 
Destourians” understood his proposal, there were still “some misgivings and apprehensions” 
among party members.”240  
Religious authorities demonstrated their disapproval of Bourguiba’s Ramadan policy in 
1960 in subtle ways. In Kairouan, authorities celebrated the beginning and end of Ramadan one 
day later than Tunis had, thereby rejecting Bourguiba’s scientific determination of the lunar 
month.241 Religious leaders in Sfax followed Kairouan, where the party was too weak and 
internally divided to enforce government policy on the population. 
Protests broke out in Kairouan in 1961, on month before Ramadan, in response to the 
governor’s decision to transfer a teacher, Abderrahman Khelif. The second imam of Kairouan’s 
most important mosque, Khelif had delivered sermons denouncing the regime’s religious policy, 
especially its stance towards Ramadan. The population of Kairouan, viewing the removal of the 
                                                        
238 Moore, Tunisia Since Independence, 58.  
239 Speech of Bourguiba, February 26th, 1960. In Tunisia Since Independence. The Huate Cour was the special tribunal set up 
in 1956 to try Youssefist supporters.   
240 Speech of Bourguiba, February 8th, 1961. In Tunisia Since Independence. 
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popular imam as a threat to their religion, protested violently in the streets, even attacking the 
governor’s official residence.242 Ultimately, Bourguiba’s offensive against Ramadan had limited 
success. Most Tunisians continued to publicly observe the fast. As Moore suggests, although 
Bourguiba had been able to implement significant reforms through careful diplomacy, including 
the reorganization of the legal system, the Personal Status Code, and educational reforms, the 
outcome of his Ramadan policy demonstrated both the persistence of religious opposition to the 
regime as well as the social influence of the religious authorities.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the regime’s ideology, the political environment of 
opponents, and the institutional capacity of the regime interacted to influence the nature of the 
Personal Status Code and thereby the outcome of inheritance reform. It has demonstrated that 
because the incorporation of religious themes into the regime’s discursive justification for its 
political authority required Bourguiba to gain at least rhetorical support for the Personal Status 
Code from religious authorities, the threat of the Youssefist opposition at independence 
compelled Bourguiba to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious establishment, thereby 
forcing Bourguiba to make concessions to some of the establishment’s demands in drafting the 
code—including the preservation of shari’a inheritance law—in order to gain their support. 
 Bourguiba did not attempt to unilaterally impose the Personal Status Code. Outright 
repression of the religious establishment was a political impossibility at independence given the 
strength of the Youssefist opposition’s threat, which had a strong religious base. Rather, in the 
months leading up to the promulgation of the code, Bourguiba strategically prepared the ground 
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for his reforms to minimize opposition from religious forces. He courted religious authorities at 
the Zaytuna and consulted Zaytuna authorities in drafting the code’s text to gain their 
endorsement of the code. Specifically, Bourguiba consulted the Shayk El Islam who had codified 
the family law under the French protectorate, and the text of the new code was largely based off 
of the Shayk’s code, which respected shari’a law. Insofar as Bourguiba sought the Shayk’s public 
endorsement of the code to cultivate his political legitimacy, he was forced to negotiate with 
religious authorities over the text of the code and thereby retain certain elements of the shari’a, 
including the provision on inheritance law, to gain their support.  
 The timing of Bourguiba’s other controversial reforms supports the claim that the 
outright repression the religious establishment was a political impossibility at independence and 
that Bourguiba sought to postpone a head on clash with the establishment until his regime had 
consolidated political authority. Bourguiba did not attempt to directly attack the Zaytuna 
through education reform until 1958 and waited until 1960 to attempt to reform the custom of 
fasting, once the regime had consolidated its political authority. The backlash to Bourguiba’s 
fasting reform, moreover, indicates that the religious establishment continued to enjoy strong 
popular support after independence. Taken together, the education and fasting reforms indicate 
that although politically weak, the social influence of the religious authorities as well as the 
connection of the religious establishment to the Youssefist opposition compelled Bourguiba to 
coopt rather than outright suppress the establishment at independence, thereby forcing 
Bourguiba to make concessions to religious authorities in drafting the Code.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has examined why Tunisia preserved Islamic inheritance law while reforming 
almost all other areas of family law after independence. The central argument of the thesis is that 
the preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia’s Personal Status Code reflects 
concessions made to the religious establishment’s demands concerning the nature of the code as 
part of the post-independence regime’s strategy for political survival. The theoretical framework 
I adopt to explain this policy outcome emphasizes the interaction between three critical factors: 
(i) state ideology (ii) political environment and (iii) institutional capacity. I suggest that the 
preservation of Islamic inheritance law in Tunisia’s family code can be understood through the 
interaction of these three factors.  
 Over the course of the thesis, I developed the theory that while (i) the incorporation of 
religious themes into a regime’s legitimating ideology will play an important role in determining 
the kinds of polices it can adopt with regard to Islamic family law, the effects of ideology on the 
nature of the family law policy will be critically shaped by (ii) whether the political opposition 
confronting the regime has a religious base and (iii) the relative strength or weakness of the 
regime’s institutional capacity to implement its political agenda, measured as the degree of 
ideological consensus within the ruling party.  
Overall, my analysis demonstrated that because the incorporation of religious themes 
into the legitimating ideology of Bourguiba’s regime required the regime to gain rhetorical 
support for the reforms from religious authorities, contestation over the regime’s authority at 
independence compelled the regime to coopt rather than outright suppress the religious 
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establishment, thereby forcing the regime to make concessions to the establishment in drafting 
the new code—including the preservation of traditional inheritance law—in order to gain their 
support.  
Chapter Four examined how the regime’s discursive justification of its political authority 
incorporated explicit religious themes. Analyzing the speeches and statements of the state elite 
as well as foundational state documents, I demonstrated how Bourguiba’s rhetorical 
justifications for the political authority of his modernist regime were grounded in the framework 
of Islam. I emphasized that regardless of whether the incorporation of Islam into the regime’s 
legitimating ideology derived from personal conviction or political necessity, it delineated the 
range of policy options the regime could adopt regarding religion without opposing its stated 
ideological commitment to preserving the Islamic identity of the state.   
Developing the argument laid out in Chapter Four, Chapter Five examined the 
interaction of the regime’s legitimating ideology with the political environment Bourguiba 
confronted at independence and the institutional capacity of the regime. Analyzing the 
secondary literature on the politics of the nationalist movement and Neo-Destour Party, I 
demonstrated how the outright repression of the religious establishment was politically 
impossible at independence given the strength of the Youssefist opposition’s threat, which had a 
strong religious base. I then analyzed how Bourguiba strategically prepared the ground for his 
reforms to minimize opposition from religious forces and demonstrated that insofar as he 
sought the religious establishment’s public endorsement of the code to bolster his political 
legitimacy, he was forced to negotiate with religious authorities over the text of the code and 
thereby retain certain elements of the Shari’a, including the provision on inheritance law, to gain 
their support.  
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This thesis aimed to contribute to the literature on state policies on gender in the Middle 
East by developing a more complete picture of the distinctive challenges Middle Eastern states 
face in attempting to reform Islamic law. While the argument of this thesis has theoretical 
implications for scholars studying the Middle East, it also has important limitations. The 
framework developed to analyze family law policy called attention to state ideology, religious 
politics, and strategies of the political leadership to explain policy outcomes. In theoretical terms, 
it focused on the role of state ideology rather than structural conditions in determining the kinds 
of polices a Middle Eastern state can adopt. It also treated the issue of family law and women’s 
right as part of broader contestation over the status of Islam in modern society rather than larger 
state building efforts.  
In focusing on the role of politics and ideology, I have deemphasized the role of social 
and economic structures as well as state interests that are often centered in analyses of state 
policies on gender. I have thus given less attention the material interests of state elite and the 
implications of property and inheritance laws for traditional economic structures in Tunisia. This 
represents a significant gap in my discussion given that many Neo-Destour leader and party 
members were landed elite whose economic interests were directly implicated in inheritance 
reform. An in-depth analysis of the identities, interests, and personal convictions of post-
independence state elites in Tunisia was beyond the scope of this project, given that gathering 
this kind of primary source material requires lengthy and extensive field research. Examining the 
influence of the landed Neo-Destour leader and party members on the lawmaking process is 
therefore a fruitful avenue for further research on this topic.  
In addition, my argument does not appear to explain why Bourguiba’s regime did not 
reform Islamic inheritance laws after the regime had neutralized the religious establishment and 
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Youssefist opposition forces by the 1960s. Given then I take the religious nature of political 
opposition as a key factors influencing state policy on family law, this also represents a 
significant gap in my argument and suggests that my analysis overlooks other key variables at 
state in family law reform. I would suggest, however, that the issues that are most salient to 
debates concerning Islam and women’s rights are not stable over time, and that factors 
constraining the regime in the decades after independence shifted with evolving social and 
political circumstances. As such, my argument is perhaps useful to analyze critical historical 
moments rather than normal or stable politics. Further research is required to understanding the 
evolution of inheritance law debates throughout the post-independence period and can shed 
light on the issues at stake in controversy surrounding inheritance reform today.  
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Glossary 
 
agnate   male relative in the paternal line 
 
bey   monarch, ruler (in Tunisia)  
 
beylical   under the bey 
 
COLIBE   Individual Freedoms and Equality Committee 
 
habus   religious or charitable endowment, also known as waqf 
  
Hadith   a collection of traditions containing the deeds and pronouncements of the  
Prophet Muhammad 
 
Hanafi   one of the schools of legal interpretation in Islam, historically the law of a  
minority of Muslims in the Maghrib 
 
ijma   community consensus 
 
ijtihad   interpretation, the use of independent reasoning in law and theology 
 
Maliki   one of the schools of legal interpretation in Islam, the school that has  
historically predominated in the Maghrib 
 
Neo-Destour  Tunisian nationalist party, founded in 1934  
  
PSC   the Tunisian Personal Status Code    
 
qadi   religious judge 
 
qiyas   reasoning by analogy  
 
résident général  supreme representative of France during colonization 
 
Shari’a   the holy law of Islam 
 
shaykh    leader in a Muslim community, head of a tribe   
 
Sunna   deeds and pronouncements of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the  
Hadith 
 
Sunni   majority branch of Islam  
 
ulama   religious scholars  
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wazir   court official, government minister 
 
Zaytuna   Tunisian faculty of theology and center of religious scholarship  
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Appendix B 
 
Note on Transliteration 
 
The transliteration of Maghribi names into English requires choices on the part of 
scholars studying the Maghrib. While proper names in the Maghrib have historically been 
written in the French transliteration in scholarly writing, the transliteration of Arabic into French 
versus English largely differs in spelling. The system adopted by the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES) is now widely used for the transliteration of Arabic into English.  
When writing proper names in the text of this thesis, I have chosen to keep the French 
transliteration that readers are likely to encounter in other sources on this topic. Thus, I use 
Destour instead of the IJMES’s Dustur. In the glossary, however, I transliterate common words 
according to the system adopted by the IJMES.  
In addition, I have chosen to omit diacritics in the text of the thesis for the clarity and 
accessibility of the text to readers from all academic backgrounds. Thus, I use ulama instead of 
‘ulamā, Shari’a instead of Sharī’a, and Zaytuna instead of Zaytūna, among other key terms.  
 
 
